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Aggregate to Target Nominal 
GDP 
Martin Feldstein and James H. Stock 
This paper examines the feasibility of using a monetary aggregate to influence 
the path of nominal gross domestic product (GDP) with the ultimate goal of 
reducing the average rate of  inflation and the instability of  real output. We 
measure the strength and stability of the link between the broad monetary ag- 
gregate (M2) and nominal GDP and we assess the likelihood that an active rule 
for modifying M2 growth from quarter to quarter would reduce the volatility 
of nominal GDP growth. 
Our general conclusion is that the relation between M2 and nominal GDP 
is sufficiently strong and stable to warrant a further investigation into using M2 
to influence nominal GDP in a predictable way. The correlation between nomi- 
nal GDP and past values of M2 is, of course, relatively weak, so the ability to 
control nominal GDP is far from perfect. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests 
that a simple rule for varying M2 in response to observed changes in nominal 
GDP would reduce the volatility of nominal GDP relative to both the historic 
record and the likely effect of a passive constant-money-growth-rate  rule. Our 
calculations indicate that the probability that this simple rule reduces the vari- 
ance of annual nominal GDP growth over a typical decade is 85 percent. 
The paper begins in section 1.1 with a discussion of the goals of monetary 
policy and of the specific form in which we shall assess the success of alterna- 
tive monetary rules. Section 1.2 presents several alternative monetary policy 
rules that will be evaluated in the paper. Section 1.3 then discusses three issues 
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that must be resolved if  a monetary aggregate is to be useful for targeting 
nominal GDP. These include not only the strength and stability of  the link 
between nominal GDP and M2 but also the apparent inability of  the Federal 
Reserve to control M2 in the short term and the risk that a more explicit use 
of a monetary aggregate to target nominal GDP would weaken the statistical 
relationship we  have  found in  the  historic evidence (that is, the  so-called 
Goodhardt’s Law problem). 
In section 1.4 we present evidence about the strength of  the Link  between 
M2 and nominal GDP and discuss Granger causality tests for the entire sample 
and for subsamples. Section 1.5 presents more explicit tests of the stability of 
the link between M2 and nominal GDP. Our focus on M2 reflects a belief that 
a broad monetary aggregate is likely to have a stronger and more stable relation 
with nominal GDP than a narrower aggregate. We test this assumption in sec- 
tion 1.6 by examining the strength and stability of the link from the monetary 
base and M1 to nominal GDP, and find strong evidence of  instability in both 
the base/GDP and Ml/GDP relations. There is much literature on the link from 
financial  variables  to  output  (recent  contributions  include  Bernanke  and 
Blinder 1992 and Friedman and Kuttner 1992, 1993a), and our results on the 
apparent usefulness and stability of the M2/GDP relation are at odds with some 
of it. As we explain, this is due to our focus on nominal rather than real output, 
to particulars of  specification (we explicitly adopt an error-correction frame- 
work), and to our use of recently developed econometric tests for parameter 
stability. 
Sections 1.7 and 1.8 then derive an optimal rule for targeting nominal GDP 
in a simple model and compare its performance with simpler alternative rules. 
Although a considerable amount has been written on the theory of  nominal 
GDP targeting, fewer studies have examined the practical aspects of nominal 
GDP targeting; notable exceptions are Taylor (1983, McCallum (1988, 1990), 
Pecchenino and Rasche  (1990), Judd  and Motley  (1991,  1992), and  Hess, 
Small, and Brayton (1992). The investigation in sections 1.7 and 1.8 is in the 
spirit of these studies, except that we focus on probabilistic statements about 
the size and likelihood of  improvements that result from using M2 to target 
nominal GDP. Section 1.9 examines the predictive validity of  our M2-based 
time-series models by  comparing them with private forecasts. Section 1.10 
then returns to the question of the Federal Reserve’s apparent inability to con- 
trol the M2 money stock and discusses how that problem could be remedied 
by broader reserve requirements with interest paid on those reserves. 
1.1  The Goals of Monetary Policy 
It is widely agreed that the goals of monetary policy are a low rate of infla- 
tion (“price stability”) and a small gap between actual real GDP and potential 
real GDP. There is general agreement that a low long-term rate of inflation can 9  The Use of  Monetary Aggregate to Target Nominal GDP 
be achieved by  sufficiently limiting the rate of growth of a broad monetary 
aggregate over a long enough period of time. 
All the monetary policy rules that we consider in this paper are compatible 
with achieving any particular long-run average rate of inflation. Moreover, in 
the models that we consider, the short-term monetary policy rule that is se- 
lected does not affect the ability to achieve a low long-term average level of 
inflation. Technically, we are assuming that the Federal Reserve could set the 
long-run inflation rate by the identity that mean inflation equals mean money 
growth plus mean velocity growth less mean real output growth. Empirical 
evidence suggests that the long-run mean of the growth of M2 velocity is zero 
(a consequence of  the long-run money demand functions reported in section 
1.4).  Although there is much interesting research on the relation between long- 
term real output and long-term money growth (a recent empirical contribution 
is King and Watson 1992), the problem of setting the means is separate from 
the problem of short-term stabilization considered here. In this sense, any gains 
achieved by short-run stabilization are gains in addition to those achieved by 
choosing the  average money-growth  rate  which  achieves  low  long-run  in- 
flation. 
The general goal of reducing the gap between actual and potential GDP in 
the short and medium term can be made more precise in  a variety of ways. 
This paper takes the approach of evaluating economic performance by the vari- 
ance of the quarterly nominal GDP growth rate. This focus on the variance of 
nominal GDP implies giving equal weights to short-term variations of inflation 
and of real output. Alternative measures of short-term performance that might 
be used instead include the variance of real GDP growth and the mean shortfall 
of real GDP from potential GDP. Although such measures would ignore the 
short-term variation in inflation rates, the desired low long-run average rate of 
inflation would be assured by setting the appropriately low mean growth rate 
of the monetary aggregate. 
Judging performance by  the variance of the nominal GDP growth rate is 
equivalent to targeting the growth rate of nominal GDP rather than a path of 
nominal GDP levels. Although this distinction has no implication for the long- 
term inflation rate, it does affect the optimal response of policy to short-term 
shocks to the economy. In particular, the implicit desired future path of nomi- 
nal GDP is always independent of the starting point. 
This can be seen more clearly by contrasting the target of minimizing the 
variance of  the nominal  GDP growth rate  (around  its  mean  for the entire 
sample) with the alternative target of minimizing the variance of nominal GDP 
around a trend with an exponential rate of growth equal to the sum of the 
desired rate of inflation and the mean real GDP growth rate in the sample. If 
the economy starts on the trend line, the two criteria are the same for the first 
period. But any departure from the trend during the first period implies a differ- 
ent standard for the second period. The criterion of minimizing the variance of 10  Martin Feldstein and James H. Stock 
the nominal GDP growth rate ignores any “base drift” in nominal GDP. It can 
be thought of as minimizing the variance around the trend line with the starting 
point of the trend rebased in each period to the actual level achieved in the 
previous period. 
Which of  the two approaches is preferable depends on the types of shocks 
that are most likely to be encountered, the differential effects of money on real 
output and inflation,  and the ultimate objective  of monetary  policy. For ex- 
ample, if in the extreme real output is a random walk unaffected by monetary 
policy, then a nominal GDP level target will result in the price level being a 
random walk, so that the future price level will deviate arbitrarily far from its 
desired fixed level. On the other hand, minimizing quarterly fluctuations  in 
the growth of  nominal GDP will result in constant (say, zero) inflation, thus 
stabilizing the future price level. Similarly, if the growth rate of potential real 
GDP varies significantly from quarter to quarter, minimizing the variance of 
the growth rate would be the better policy. The alternative of minimizing the 
variance from a prespecified nominal GDP path would require a contractionary 
policy after a positive productivity shock, even though there had been no in- 
crease in inflation,  and an expansionary policy after a negative productivity 
shock, even though there had been no decrease in inflation. We have not ex- 
plored this issue in the current research. 
Our tests of the strength and stability of the link between M2 and nominal 
GDP are relevant, however, whether the criterion by which policy is judged is 
the variance  of  nominal GDP around its mean or the deviations of nominal 
GDP from a predetermined target path. The choice of criterion determines how 
the money stock should vary from quarter to quarter to minimize the relevant 
variance. 
1.2  Alternative Approaches to Monetary Policy 
Although the Federal Reserve is concerned with inflation and real economic 
activity, monetary  policy  must  be made by  adjusting  some monetary  vari- 
able-a  monetary aggregate, an interest rate, or the exchange rate. In this sec- 
tion we discuss three possible approaches. This is far from an exhaustive set 
of alternatives, but rather provides a context for comparing an M2 approach to 
nominal GDP targeting with other commonly discussed options. 
1.2.1  The Status Quo: Judgmental Eclecticism 
In practice, the Federal Reserve controls the volume of bank reserves  (a 
monetary  aggregate) by  open-market  sales of  Treasury  securities. In recent 
years, the volume of such sales has been adjusted to target the value of  the 
Federal funds interest rate. Thus, for time intervals up to several weeks, any 
disturbance in the statistical relation between the Federal funds rate and bank 
reserves  (that is, in the banking  system’s bivariate demand function  for re- 
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desired level of the Federal funds rate. In  this context, the interest rate is the 
exogenous variable and the volume of reserves is endogenous. For longer peri- 
ods of time, the relationship is more ambiguous because the Federal Reserve's 
Open Market Committee (FOMC) may revise the Fed funds-rate target in part 
in response to the magnitude of reserve growth and the corresponding move- 
ment of  the narrow monetary aggregate M1 (as well as to other aspects of 
economic and financial performance). 
It is significant that the FOMC now makes decisions and issues operating 
instructions to the New  York Federal Reserve Bank in terms of the Federal 
funds interest rate and not in terms of M2 or some other monetary aggregate. 
Each member of the FOMC may  vote to increase or decrease the Fed funds 
rate for his or her own reasons. Some see a reduction of the Federal funds rate 
as a way  of  increasing the rate of growth of M2 and therefore of  subsequent 
nominal and real GDP. Others may ignore the potential impact on the money 
stock and choose an interest rate change because of what they regard to be the 
likely effect on inflation and real output.' At times, some FOMC members may 
consider the effect of changes in the Fed funds rate on the international value 
of the dollar. Still others may emphasize the psychological effect of changes in 
interest rates as an indication of the Fed's resolve to fight inflation or stimulate 
economic activity. 
We  do not try to model and test an explicit interest-rate rule for monetary 
policy or any other complex  judgmental rule. Rather we take the historic record 
of  economic performance as indicative of  what  the  Federal  Reserve  can 
achieve by  such an eclectic judgmental policy. Technically many of the statis- 
tics we report, in particular the regression R2's and tests for predictive content 
in sections 1.4 and 1.6 and the performance measures in sections 1.7 and 1.8, 
should be interpreted as providing evidence on the ability of alternative poli- 
cies to improve upon past performance. Indeed, were past performance optimal 
in the sense that money had been used to minimize the variance of quarterly 
nominal GDP, then we would expect to find no historical correlation between 
money and future GDP growth. In contrast, were the historical M2/GDP rela- 
tionship strong and stable, this would open the door to an investigation of 
whether this link could be exploited to control GDP more effectively than has 
been done historically. 
1.2.2  Passive Monetary Policy: A Constant Growth Rate of M2 
A natural starting place among explicit quantitative monetary rules is Milton 
Friedman's proposal for a policy of constant growth of the money supply. Set- 
ting the constant growth rate of money equal to the expected growth of poten- 
tial GDP minus the expected rate of  increase of velocity implies a zero ex- 
1. Twice a year the Federal Reserve Board staff presents to the FOMC simulations of a macro- 
economic model which emphasize the direct effect of alternative interest-rate levels on inflation 
and real economic activity (rather than through a monetary aggregate), and some members of the 
committee undoubtedly see their votes in these terms. 12  Martin Feldstein and James H. Stock 
pected rate of inflation. Small errors in the estimated rate of growth of either 
potential GDP or velocity cause correspondingly small departures of inflation 
from price stability. 
Friedman argues that a constant rate of money growth is actually likely to 
result  in a more stable path  of  nominal GDP than  a more active monetary 
policy  aimed at achieving such stability (Friedman  1953). Friedman’s argu- 
ment can be summarized easily in the framework in which stability is defined 
as the variance of the growth rate of nominal GDP. Suppose that nominal GDP 
growth consists of  two parts, one which would be achieved under a constant 
growth rule and one which reflects the impact of an activist rule. Then the 
variance of nominal GDP growth is the sum of the variances of these compo- 
nents, plus their covariance. Friedman’s point is that activist policy reduces 
volatility only if the covariance is sufficiently negative to offset the additional 
variance contribution from activist control. 
This decomposition provides a useful way to interpret the regression results 
elsewhere in the literature and in section 1.4. If M2 enters significantly, then 
an optimal or nearly optimal policy can reduce total volatility. However, if the 
regression R2  is small, then the gains from such control will be modest. More- 
over, following the “wrong” policy can increase rather than decrease output 
volatility. 
1.2.3  Active Targeting Rules for Monetary Policy 
McCallum (1988, 1990),  Taylor (1 985), and others have developed and sim- 
ulated alternative rules for managing monetary policy with the aim of stabiliz- 
ing nominal GDP growth. We build on this literature in sections  1.7 and  1.8 
by proposing an optimal rule for using monetary policy to target nominal GDP 
and a simple partial-adjustment rule that approximates the effect of the opti- 
mal rule. 
As part of our analysis of these rules, we calculate the probability that they 
would reduce the variance of nominal GDP growth. The specific calculation 
we perform addresses the following thought experiment: Suppose the Federal 
Reserve were to adopt a particular nominal GDP targeting rule and use it for a 
decade. Based on the data available to us from 1959 to 1992, what is the proba- 
bility that the variance of quarterly nominal GDP growth would be less over 
this ten-year span than it would be under the status quo? What is the expected 
percent reduction in the ten-year standard deviation of quarterly GDP growth 
under the rule, and, more generally, what does the distribution of potential 
reductions look like? Our statistics answer these questions, and also qualify 
the distribution of ten-year variance reductions in two- and four-quarter growth 
of GDP. This calculation incorporates both the parameter uncertainty arising 
from working with a finite historical data set and the additional uncertainty 
introduced by  different possible ten-year paths of future shocks to the econ- 
omy. When the policy rule is designed to minimize quarterly GDP volatility, 
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since by construction the monetary policy is designed to minimize the popula- 
tion (multiple decade, long data set) value of this ratio. Our calculations show 
that in principle the optimal M2 rule would have outperformed status-quo pol- 
icy with a rather high probability. 
The complexity of the optimal rule for varying M2, even in the simple model 
that we analyze, suggests that explicit optimization is more relevant as a bench- 
mark than as an actual prescription for application by the Federal Reserve. We 
therefore examine simpler partial-adjustment rules, which are in the spirit of 
the rules examined by Taylor (1985) and McCallum (1988, 1990). In particular, 
the rule for which we tabulate results adjusts M2 40 percent toward closing the 
gap between realized and desired nominal GDP growth. Performance meas- 
ures for this simplified rule show that it would have resulted in nominal GDP 
stabilization close to that of the optimal rule and better than the implicit status- 
quo policy. Moreover, long-run mean inflation would be reduced by choosing 
a lower mean money-growth rate. Thus this rule could result in both lower 
mean inflation and reduced volatility of GDP growth, relative to the status quo. 
1.3  The Usefulness of a Monetary Targeting Rule: Three Issues 
The research in this paper shows that an active monetary rule of the type 
described in section 1.2.3 and studied in sections 1.7 and 1.8 can in principle 
achieve a more satisfactory economic performance (as measured by the rate of 
inflation and the stability of nominal GDP growth) than that which has been 
achieved by  the “eclectic judgmentalism” currently practiced by the Federal 
Reserve or would be achieved by  the passive policy of  constant M2 growth 
proposed by Milton Friedman. We  show also that the professional forecasters 
do not appear to have an advantage relative to a simple M2-based vector autor- 
egression (VAR) model at forecasting nominal GDP and therefore tentatively 
conclude that monetary activism based on professional forecasts may be no 
more satisfactory than policies based on simplier forecasting models. 
The conclusion that a monetary rule can “in principle” be useful reflects our 
finding of  a sufficiently stable link between money and nominal GDP. Two 
other issues must be resolved favorably in order to conclude that monetary 
targeting would be useful in practice as well as in principle. Briefly, a useful 
monetary targeting rule requires (a)  a sufficiently stable link between money 
and nominal GDP; (b)  satisfactory behavior of the Federal Reserve; and (c) a 
limited system response to the change in monetary policy. 
1.3.1  A Stable Link between Money and Nominal GDP 
The statistical tests presented in sections 1.4 and 1.5 show that M2 has pre- 
dictive content for nominal GDP and that the relationship appears to have been 
stable over  time.  More precisely, section  1.4  shows that  the link between 
money and nominal GDP exists for the entire thirty-year sample. It is strong 
enough that Milton Friedman’s case against active policy cannot be based on 14  Martin Feldstein and James H. Stock 
the absence of an adequate link between short-run variations of M2 and nomi- 
nal GDP. The evidence in section 1.5 suggests that the parameters have been 
stable in the sense that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of parameter con- 
stancy using several recently proposed tests for parameter stability. 
1.3.2  Satisfactory Behavior of the Federal Reserve 
Milton Friedman and others base their argument against an activist mone- 
tary policy in part on the claim that there is an inherent inflationary bias in 
central bank behavior: Even if  the Federal Reserve could control M2 com- 
pletely and knew an optimizing rule for setting M2, they would violate that 
rule because of political pressures or other reasons. 
There is of  course no way  of  fully answering that criticism. We  do note 
however that the Federal Reserve and other central banks around the world 
have over the past decade been pursuing relatively tough anti-inflationary  poli- 
cies and that those central banks with greater independence have pursued that 
goal more aggressively. That is no guarantee about the future behavior of the 
Federal Reserve. Those who believe that any central bank that has discretion 
will eventually act incompetently or perversely may or may not be right, but 
they cannot be persuaded by  evidence. 
Nevertheless, if  our evidence on the predictive link between money  and 
nominal GDP is accepted, those who would  still advocate a passive fixed- 
money-growth rule would have to argue that the gain in terms of reduced infla- 
tion that results from such a policy outweighs the potential benefit in terms of 
the output stability that  can be achieved by  an active rule-based monetary 
policy. 
It seems likely, moreover, that any policy based on an explicitly quantitative 
rule is less subject to political and other pressures than the purely judgmen- 
tal approach currently pursued by  the Federal Reserve. Perhaps it would be 
a useful further discipline if  the Federal Reserve were to state the rule pub- 
licly and to explain to the financial and policy community whenever mone- 
tary policy did not conform to the rule over a period of, for example, six 
months, just as the Federal Reserve now announces a target range for money 
growth and  must  explain  to Congress whenever it fails to achieve money 
growth in that range. 
In  addition to the question of  the Federal Reserve’s willingness to use a 
monetary rule to target nominal GDP, there is the more technical aspect con- 
cerning the Federal Reserve’s ability to act in compliance with a rule that re- 
quires managing quarterly changes in M2. Recent experience shows that con- 
ventional short-run money demand equations have broken down (Feinman and 
Porter 1992). Evidently the Fed has not been able to estimate the volume of 
open-market operations needed to achieve its desired changes in M2. For ex- 
ample, the increase of M2 at a rate of only 2.2 percent from the fourth quarter 
of  1991 to the fourth quarter of  1992 was below the lower end of the Fed’s 
target range (2.5 percent to 6.5  percent) at a time when most Fed officials 15  The Use of Monetary Aggregate to Target Nominal GDP 
acknowledged that faster M2 growth would have been desirable. We  return to 
this problem in section 1.10 and explain that the Federal Reserve could control 
M2 by  expanding reserve requirements to include all of  the components of 
M2. Until then, we will ignore the difference between controlling reserves and 
controlling M2  and  will  assume that  the  Federal Reserve can control the 
growth of money from quarter to quarter. 
1.3.3  A Limited System Response to the Change in Monetary Policy 
Even if the relation between money and nominal GDP has been stable in the 
past, an attempt to exploit that relation in an optimizing mode could cause a 
change in these reduced-form parameters. Continuing to assume the old pa- 
rameter values would lead to suboptimal results that could, in principle, be 
worse than those implied by the existing judgmental policies. 
There are two sources of this possible instability. First, as discussed in sec- 
tion  1 .lo, to control M2 effectively would entail placing reserve requirements 
on its components. To the extent that this changes the M2hominal GDP rela- 
tion, the historical correlations upon which our analysis is based would become 
less useful. While this effect might take some time to detect, in principle these 
relations could be updated using new data and the policy rule could be modi- 
fied to account for the effect of consistent reserve requirements. 
The second source is more problematic, and concerns the empirical rele- 
vance of the Lucas critique of  all policy analysis. One extreme form of  this 
concern (suggested in a British context by  Charles Goodhardt and known as 
Goodhardt’s Law) is that trying to use M2 (or any other aggregate) to target 
nominal GDP would break the causal link with nominal GDP and make con- 
trolling M2 irrelevant. Because we use an explicitly reduced-form model, our 
calculations are an obvious target for this critique. However, all extant empiri- 
cal macro models are approximations-there  is no compelling reason to think 
that any empirical macroeconomic model incorporates the “deep parameters” 
stable to policy interventions-so  this criticism is equally applicable to all 
exercises in this area. The empirical relevance of the Lucas critique has been 
the topic of considerable debate (see, for example, Sims 1981, 1986), and we 
have little to add on this topic. Yet we note that the tests of sections 1.5 and 1.6 
suggest that the M2/GDP relation-unlike  the M UGDP relation, the monetary 
base/GDP, and the relation between various interest rates and output-has 
been stable over the past thirty years, a period which has experienced several 
shifts in Fed operating procedures. More generally, the research of Friedman 
and Schwartz (1963) that originally established the existence of a link between 
money and nominal GDP covered a much longer period of  time with even 
more substantial changes in monetary policy and economic institutions. This 
gives us reason to hope that further changes in  monetary policy would have 
limited effects on this relationship. These concerns do, however, imply that the 
relation between nominal GDP and M2 should be closely monitored were the 
Fed to change its approach to monetary policy. 16  Martin Feldstein and James H. Stock 
1.4  Strength of the Link from M2 to Nominal GDP 
The question taken up in this section is whether M2 has predictive content 
for future nominal GDP growth. We  address this by considering quarterly his- 
torical time-series data on money,  output, interest rates, and prices over the 
period  1959:  1-1992:2.  (Data  sources  and  transformations are  detailed  in 
appendix A.) Visual inspection of the time-series data from 1959:  1 to 1992:2, 
presented in figure 1.1, indicates a link between the four-quarter growth in 
M2 and nominal GDP over the business cycle and indeed over longer periods. 
However, there appears to be less correlation between M2 and either inflation 
or real GDP growth. 
Econometric evidence on the predictive content of various monetary aggre- 
gates for nominal GDP is presented in table 1.1. Each row of the table corre- 
sponds to a regression of nominal GDP growth on a constant and three lags of 
the indicated variable. As discussed in appendix A, in these regressions nomi- 
nal GDP, real GDP, the GDP deflator, and M2 appear in growth rates; individ- 
ual interest rates appear in first differences; and spreads appear in levels. The 
first numeric column of table 1.1 provides the R2 of the regression of the quar- 
terly growth of nominal GDP against the first through third lag of the indicated 
regressors. The second and third columns report the Rz’s  from regressions of 
two- and four-quarter growth (current quarter growth plus growth over the 
next, or the next  three, quarters), respectively, against the same set of  re- 
gressors. The final columns report the results of F-tests for predictive content 
(Granger causality tests) for M2 and other financial variables entering the re- 
gressions. 
The results in table 1.1 suggest that there has been a systematic relationship 
between M2 and nominal GDP over the 1959-92 sample: M2 is a statistically 
significant predictor of  nominal GDP growth at the 1 percent level in those 
regressions which include M2 or M2 in conjunction with inflation and interest 
rates. M2 is capable of  predicting a statistically significant yet quantitatively 
modest amount of  the movements in output at the one-quarter horizon; for 
example, the regressions in equations 7 and 8 indicate that M2 improves the 
one-quarter R2,  relative to using lagged real GDP growth and lagged GDP in- 
flation, by 0.127. However, at the four-quarter horizon the improvement from 
using M2 is more substantial, increasing the R2 of that regression from 0.092 
to 0.326. In contrast, while the regressions with interest rates alone (equations 
9 and 10) have comparable if somewhat smaller R2’s at the one-quarter horizon, 
their R2’s at the four-quarter horizon are less than 0.18. 
A conventional question in the literature on the money-output relationship 
is whether the inclusion of  interest rates eliminates the predictive content of 
M2 (e.g., Sims 1972, 1980). If it does, this would suggest for our purposes that 
interest rates would make a more appropriate control variable than M2. The 
results in table  1.1 indicate that for nominal GDP this is not the case. For 
example, when the ninety-day T-bill rate or the Fed funds rate is added to the 17  The Use of Monetary Aggregate to Target Nominal GDP 
(a)  Annual  Nominal GDP  growth  and M2 
Year 
(b)  Annual  GDP  deflator  growth and  M2 
Year 
(c) Annual  Real GDP  growth and  M2 
Year 
Fig. 1.1 
line); (b) GDP inflation and M2; and (c) real GDP and M2, 1960-92 
Four-quarter growth of (a) nominal GDP (solid line) and M2 (dashed Table 1.1  Predictive Content of M2 Dependent Variable: Nominal GDP Growth (estimation period: quarterly, 1960:2 to 1992:2) 
F-tests (p-values) on Lags of: 
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0.277  0.294  0.288 
0.302  0.318  0.282 
0.317  0.344  0.328 
0.094  0.113  0.092 
0.221  0.295  0.326 
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16  NGDP  PGDP  M2  R-90  CP6-G6  ZMD  0.356  0.413  0.378  6.92 
(0.000) 
17  NGDP  PGDP  R-90  G1O-GI  0.195  0.194  0.192 
























Note:  RZ,  d2(2),  and R2(4)  are, respectively, the R2’s from regressions of one-, two-, and four-quarter growth of the dependent variable onto a constant and three lags 
of  the listed regressors. Data sources and transformations are given in appendix A. The F-statistics (p-values in parentheses) test the restriction that coefficients on 
the indicated regressors are zero. In the regressions including the money demand cointegrating residual ZMD, the F-statistics on M2 include the test of this restriction. 20  Martin Feldstein and James H. Stock 
regression in equation 8, M2 remains statistically significant; in fact, the R‘  for 
the four-quarter regression declines because  of  the inclusion of  these addi- 
tional interest rates, which evidently have no additional predictive content at 
this horizon. 
The specifications discussed  thus far only incorporate short-run relation- 
ships, in  the sense that they relate growth rates to growth rates or changes. 
However, there is substantial evidence that there is a long-run relationship be- 
tween the levels of money and output (both in logs) and interest rates, which 
can be thought of as a long-run money demand relation. Unit root tests suggest 
that velocity and interest rates can be treated as being integrated of order one, 
and cointegration tests suggest that these two variables are cointegrated (see, 
for example, Hafer and Jansen  1991; Hoffman and Rasche 1991; and Stock 
and Watson 1993); thus long-run money demand can be thought of as a cointe- 
grating relation among these vectors. If so, then a candidate for inclusion in 
these output regressions is the “error correction” term, which is the residual 
from the long-run money demand relation. Previous investigations suggest that 
a unit income elasticity is appropriate (see Stock and Watson 1993 for results 
and a discussion), so the money demand cointegrating vector is specified here 
as ZMD, = ln(X,/M,) -  PrR,,  where X, is log nominal GDP, M,  is log nominal 
money, and R, is the level of  the interest rate, here taken to be the ninety- 
day Treasury-bill rate. The interest semielasticity of money demand, Pr, was 
estimated  by  asymptotic  maximum  likelihood  using  the  Philips-Loretan 
(1991)/Saikkonen (1991)/Stock-Watson (1993) procedure, and one lag of the 
resulting estimate of ZMD, was entered as an additional regressor in the speci- 
fications in table 1.  l?  Thus these regressions correspond to a single-equation 
error correction  model  (see, for example, Hendry  and Ericsson  1991). Al- 
though this motivation for including ZMD stems from the theory of cointegra- 
tion, this term has a natural interpretation in a regression of nominal output 
growth on money: it controls for deviations in velocity from its long-run value 
as determined by the interest rate. 
The results in table 1.1 indicate that the long-run money demand residual 
has noticeable predictive power; for example, adding ZMD to regression  11 
improves the one-quarter  R2 by  0.061  and improves the four-quarter R2 by 
0.078. When the money demand residual is included in the regression, the 
hypothesis that money does not enter implies that the lagged first differences 
and the money demand residual do not enter; thus in the regressions with ZMD 
the Granger causality tests for M2 in table 1.1 test both sets of exclusions (on 
all lags of M2 growth and on lagged ZMD). The hypothesis that M2 is statisti- 
2. Specifically, the long-run interest semielasticities were estimated using the Dynamic OLS 
(DOLS) procedure in Stock and Watson  (1  993) with a four leads and lags, with standard errors 
computed using an AR(2) model for the regression error. The estimated long-run interest semielas- 
ticity of  M2 demand is .0061 (standard error .0020),  based on the ninety-day Treasury-bill rate. 
The DOLS regression was run over 60:2-91:2,  with the remaining observations used for initial 
and terminal conditions. 21  The Use of Monetary Aggregate to Target Nominal GDP 
cally insignificant in the one-quarter horizon continues to be rejected in these 
regressions. 
Despite this statistical significance of M2 in these regressions, it should be 
emphasized that the R2’s for these regressions are all rather low. For example, 
an R’  for a four-quarter horizon of 39 percent (equation 13) indicates that the 
ratio of the root mean square error (RMSE) from using this regression, relative 
to using  a constant forecast, is only 0.78. Looking ahead to the question of 
whether M2 can be used to further reduce the fluctuations in GDP, this inherent 
relative unpredictability of nominal GDP growth over the past three decades 
places a limit on any gains from modifying the control of M2 relative to the 
Fed’s historical behavior. 
Most of  the  recent  research  has  focused  on the  relation  between  money 
growth and real, rather than nominal, output (e.g., Bernanke and Blinder 1992; 
Friedman and Kuttner 1992, 1993b; Stock and Watson 1989a). As a basis of 
comparison, we therefore present in table  1.2 econometric  evidence on the 
predictive content of M2 for real GDP growth. In the case of real GDP growth, 
money has substantial predictive  content and continues to enter each of the 
regressions with ZMD at the  1 percent level. 
It is interesting to note that M2 is significant even in the regression with the 
commercial paper-Treasury-bill  spread. Other authors, in particular Friedman 
and Kuttner (1992, 1993a) (see also Bemanke 1993), have found that the inclu- 
sion of this spread in similar regressions has eliminated the predictive content 
of money. The main difference between those results and the results in table 1.2 
is that the F-tests in table 1.2 include the lagged money demand cointegrating 
residual, as well as lags of money growth; the F-statistic on the three lags of 
money growth alone in the table  1.2 regression with the paper-bill spread is 
1.68, which, with ap-value of 0.175, is not significant at the 10  percent level. 
However, the t-statistic on the cointegrating residual in this regression is 3.23, 
and the joint F-test  is significant.  This phenomenon is present in the corre- 
sponding nominal GDP regression with the paper-bill spread, in which the F- 
test on the lags of  money  alone is  1.76 (p-value 0.16) and the t-statistic  on 
ZMD is 3.7 1. In all other regressions in table 1.1, however, the F-test on just 
the lags of M2 growth is significant at the 5 percent level.3 This statistical 
significance of the money demand residual agrees with recent independent re- 
sults obtained by Konishi, Ramey, and Granger (1992), who find that the loga- 
rithm of M2 velocity is a significant predictor of real GDP growth; however, 
3. The in-sample R2’s  are typically larger for the real GDP and inflation regressions (not reported 
here) than they are for the nominal GDP regressions. This might appear puzzling at first, since 
nominal GDP growth is the sum of real GDP growth and GDP inflation. However, over this period 
real GDP growth and inflation growth, and especially their predictable components, have been 
negatively correlated; that is, predictably high inflation has been associated with predictably slow 
real growth. For example, in a VAR(3) with real GDP, GDP inflation, M2, and R-90, the in-sample 
forecasts of  one-quarter  inflation and  real GDP growth from  1960:2 to 1992:2 have  a cross- 
correlation of -  SO  while their forecast errors have a correlation of  .07. Table 1.2  Predictive Content of M2. Dependent Variable: Real GDP Growth (estimation period: quarterly, 1960:2 to 19922) 
F-tests (p-values) on Lags of: 
Eq.  Regressors  R2  R’(2)  R2(4)  M2  R-90  R-FF  GIO-GI  CP6-G6 
1  RGDP  0.093  0.091  0.039 
2  RGDP  M2  0.181  0.206  0.145  5.47 
3  RGDP  M2  R-90  0.222  0.280  0.328  2.38  3.16 
4  RGDP  M2  R-FF  0.262  0.335  0.357  2.16  5.46 
5  RGDP  M2  R-90  R-FF  0.265  0.340  0.351  1.98  1.16  3.30 
6  RGDP  M2  R-90  ZMD  0.293  0.361  0.379  5.19  2.21 
7  NGDP  PGDP  0.118  0.162  0.196 
8  NGDP  PGDP  M2  0.265  0.359  0.426  9.15 
9  NGDP  PGDP  R-FF  0.235  0.316  0.382  7.22 
(0.001) 
(0.073)  (0.027) 
(0.096)  (0.002) 
(0.121)  (0.327)  (0.023) 






























M2  R-90 
M2  R-FF 
M2  R-90 
M2  R-90 
R-90  CP6-G6 
M2  R-90 
R-90  GlO-GI 




ZMD  0.329 
POIL  ZMD  0.313 
0.290 
CP6-G6  ZMD  0.383 
0.235 
GlO-GI  ZMD  0.359 
0.246  0.339 
0.352  0.437 
0.384  0.463 
0.400  0.457 
0.391  0.444 
0.396  0.383 
0.486  0.468 
0.304  0.384 







































Note: See the note to table 1.1. 24  Martin Feldstein and James H. Stock 
Konishi, Ramey, and Granger use  M2 velocity and thus impose a long-run 
interest semielasticity of money demand of zero rather than estimating it as we 
do here. 
The generally low predictive content of interest rates for nominal GDP con- 
trasts with the findings for real GDP. For example, the regression of real output 
growth  on  lags  of  NGDP,  PGDP, R-90,  and  G1O-GI  (the Treasury yield 
spread) has a four-quarter R2 of 0,384, while its four-quarter R2 for nominal 
GDP is only 0.192. This is consistent with previous results in the literature that 
emphasize the value of the slope of the yield term curve as a forecaster of real 
output (Estrella and Hardouvelis 1991; Stock and Watson 1989b, 1990). 
1.5  Stability of the Link from M2 to Nominal GDP 
This section examines the stability of the direct link from M2 to nominal 
GDP. In their investigation of  the M2/output relation Friedman  and Kuttner 
(1992) concluded that much of the full-sample predictive content of money for 
both nominal and real income was attributable to the  196Os, a finding they 
attributed to disintermediation during the 1970s and 1980s. As a starting point, 
we therefore consider whether the main findings of  section 1.4 are robust to 
using the shorter sample with Friedman and Kuttner’s (1992) starting date of 
1970:3. 
Table 1.3 presents the summary statistics of  table  1.1, evaluated over the 
more recent sample. In general, M2 has somewhat less predictive content in 
the later sample, although the deterioration in forecasting performance is mod- 
est. For example, the four-quarter R2 for the regression with lagged nominal 
GDP growth and lagged M2 growth is 0.30 in the full sample and 0.25 in the 
later sample. The Granger causality test statistics indicate that M2 continues 
to be significant, albeit only at the 5 percent level in most regressions rather 
than at the  1 percent level found in table  1.1. Because this sample period is 
only two-thirds the length of the full sample, one would not expect to find the 
statistical significance of the monetary variables to be as strong as that which 
could be found over the full sample, even if the relationship is stable. For this 
reason, a more useful statistic is the marginal R2’s from adding money to the 
regressions. While the increases remain economically significant, they drop in 
the later sample: at the four-quarter horizon, in the regression with nominal 
GDP, inflation, and the ninety-day Treasury-bill rate, over the full sample M2 
alone has a marginal R2  of 0.149 and, in conjunction with ZMD, of 0.227; over 
the later subsample, these marginal Rz’s are, respectively, 0.073 and 0.185. In 
the later sample, when interest rates, M2, and ZMD are included, interest rates 
are never significant at the 5 percent level, while M2 and ZMD are jointly 
significant at the 5 percent level in all regressions. 
The results in table 1.3 contrast with the findings of Friedman and Kuttner 
(1992). Although the primary focus of their investigation was real output, their 
table 1 presents results on forecasts of nominal GDP. One of their conclusions Table 1.3  Predictive Content of M2. Dependent Variable: Nominal GDP Growth (estimation period: quarterly, 1970:3 to 1992:2) 
F-tests (p-values)  on Lags of 
Eq.  Regressors  R-90  R-FF  G1O-Gl  CP6-G6  R2(2)  R2(4)  M2  RZ 
1  NGDP 
2  NGDP 
3  NGDP 
4  NGDP 
5  NGDP 
6  NGDP 
7  NGDP 
8  NGDP 
9  NGDP 
10  NGDP 























0.075  0.088  0.082 
0.186  0.247  0.250 
0.229  0.226  0.231 
0.232  0.238  0.239 
0.238  0.229  0.223 
0.246  0.256  0.251 
0.057  0.091  0.079 
0.159  0.233  0.271 
0.156  0.179  0.171 
0.135  0.156  0.183 



















1.21  1.30 








(0.063) Table 1.3  (continued) 
~~~ 
F-tests (p-values) on Lags of: 
Eq.  Regressors  R2  R2(2)  R2(4)  M2  R-90  R-FF  GlO-GI  CP6G6 
12  NGDP  PGDP  M2  R-FF  0.209  0.224  0.261  2.75 




14  NGDP  PGDP  M2  R-90  POIL  ZMD  0.224  0.298  0.342  3.89 
15  NGDP  PGDP  R-90  CP6G6  0.171  0.205  0.169 
16  NGDP  PGDP  M2  R-90  CP6-G6  ZMD  0.269  0.346  0.347  3.51 
(0.011) 
17  NGDP  PGDP  R-90  GlO-G1  0.172  0.233  0.248 
























Nore: ZMD was computed using the full-sample estimated cointegrating vector. See the note to table 1.1. 27  The Use of Monetary Aggregate to Target Nominal GDP 
was that, over the 1970:3-1990:4  sample, M2 ceased to be a significant fore- 
caster of  nominal GDP. In a mechanical sense, the difference between their 
findings and ours is explained, in order of importance, by (a)  our inclusion of 
the error correction term ZMD; (b)  the choice of lag length; and (c) the slight 
difference in sample  period^.^ If, as argued in section 1.4, the cointegrated 
model applies, then the error correction term should be included in the regres- 
sion, and because ZMD includes M2, a test of  whether M2 Granger causes 
output should test both lags of M2 growth and the error correction term. Con- 
cerning lag length, in the regression on GDP and M2 growth, the first lag of 
M2 is significant, but the others, considered one at a time, are not; moreover, 
a joint test of  the significance of  the fourth lags in the regression suggests 
choosing the shorter specification. The effect of including the final six quarters 
in the sample suggests that the recent slow growth of nominal output and M2 
in the face of low and declining interest rates and a sharply positive yield curve 
has tilted the results somewhat toward M2 as a predictor. While we therefore 
prefer the specifications in table 1.3, those results and Friedman and Kuttner’s 
(1992) findings suggest investigating further the question of whether the M2/ 
nominal-output relation is stable. The differences between our findings and 
Friedman and Kuttner’s ultimately point to the limitations of simple regression 
statistics, and suggest that information of  a different type is needed on the 
stability of this relationship. 
We therefore subject these relations to a series of formal tests for parameter 
stability. The overall purpose of  these tests is to detect parameter instability 
when the type of  instability is unknown a priori. If  it were presumed that a 
break had occurred at some known date, then the simplest test for such a break 
would be a Chow-type test for a shift in the parameters. However, in practice 
the date at which the break occurred is typically unknown a priori and the 
candidate break date is based upon knowledge of  the historical data. In this 
case, the subsequent test statistic does not have its classical sampling distribu- 
tion, and the precise sampling distribution will depend on the preliminary 
method used to select the break date. (Christian0 1992 provides an empirical 
example of this point; for the associated econometric theory, see the July 1992 
special issue of the Journal of  Business and Economic Statistics on unit root 
4. Friedman and Kutmer’s (1992)  regression 3 in their table Ib and regression 2 in our table 1.3 
are the most directly comparable. Both regress quarterly nominal output growth on lagged growth 
of nominal output and M2. Friedman and Kuttner use four lags over 19703-1990:4 and nominal 
gross national product (GNP), and report an  F-statistic of 2.37. Using nominal GDP rather than 
nominal GNP, over 1970:3-1990:4  with four lags this F-statistic is 2.85 (p-value .030). The p- 
value of the test of the hypothesis that three lags of both M2 and GDP are adequate is 0.64. Using 
three lags and nominal GDP, 19703-19904,  the Granger causality statistic is 3.89 (p-value ,012). 
Using the  1970:3-1992:2 sample, with four lags it is 3.39 (p-value ,013;  the test of three versus 
four lags for M2 and GDP has a p-value of .69), and with three lags it is 4.80 (p-value ,004).  the 
value in our table 1.3, regression 2. The remaining differences presumably are accounted for by 
their use of GNF’  rather than GDP and by data revisions. 28  Martin Feldstein and James H. Stock 
and break-point tests.) The test statistics considered here handle this difficulty 
by explicitly treating the break data as unknown. 
Three classes of tests are considered. These tests are described in appendix 
B and are briefly summarized here. Tests in the first class look for a single 
structural break which occurred at an unknown date during the sample. These 
tests are based on the sequence of likelihood ratio statistics testing the hypothe- 
sis that the break occurred in quarter k. The most familiar of these tests is the 
Quandt likelihood ratio statistic (the QLR statistic), which is the maximum 
over k of these likelihood ratio statistics; the other two tests are the average of 
the likelihood ratio statistics (mean-Chow) and an exponential average of these 
proposed by  Andrews and Ploberger (1991) (AP Exp-W). As  discussed by 
Andrews and Ploberger (1991), these tests are designed to have  good power 
properties against a single break in one or more of the regression coefficients. 
These tests are implemented with trimming parameter A = 0.15 (see appendix 
B). For comparison purposes, we  also report the value of  the conventional 
Chow test, testing for a single break occumng in  1979:3 (Chow). However, 
this date is conventional in the literature precisely because it is associated with 
the Fed’s change in operating procedures and the double recessions of  1979- 
82. Because this break date is at least in part data-dependent, conventional 
critical values are inappropriate and proper p-values are not  readily ascer- 
tained. 
Tests in the second class are similar in spirit to the Brown-Durbin-Evans 
CUSUM statistic, except that the statistics here are computed using the full- 
sample residuals as suggested by Ploberger and Kramer (1992a, 1992b). These 
tests are the maximum of the squared scaled partial sum process of the residu- 
als (P-K max) and its average (P-K meansq). These tests mainly have power 
against breaks in the intercept in the regression in question. 
Unlike the previous tests, the final class of statistics is derived to have power 
against continuously shifting parameters. These tests, due to Nyblom (1989), 
are derived as LM tests of the null of constant coefficients against the altema- 
tive that the regression coefficients follow a random walk, although they also 
have power against single-break alternatives. Two versions of these tests are 
considered: the “L-all” statistic tests the hypothesis that all the regression coef- 
ficients are constant against the random walk alternative, while the “L-fin” 
statistic tests only the constancy of the coefficients on the financial variables 
(money, interest rates, spreads, and the money demand cointegrating residual). 
In practice, these tests often yield different inferences. Because the various 
tests were derived to have power against different alternatives, when used to- 
gether they can provide insights into which types of  instabilities, if  any, are 
present in these regressions. 
The results of these tests are presented in table  1.4 for the nominal GDP 
forecasting regressions in table  1.1. In  all the M2 regressions, the only tests 
which reject at the 5 percent level are the Ploberger-Kramer tests (ignoring the 
fixed-Chow test, for which we cannot compute proper critical values because Table 1.4  Tests for Structural Breaks and Time-Varying Parameters with M2. Dependent Variable: Nominal GDP 
Growth (estimation period: quarterly, 1%0:2  to 1992:2) 
mean-  P-K 



















NGDP  6.32 
NGDP  M2  12.47 
NGDP  M2  R-90  20.13 
NGDP  M2  R-FF  14.52 
NGDP  M2  R-90  R-FF  28.31 
NGDP  M2  R-90  ZMD  25.22 
NGDP  PGDP  17.71 
NGDP  PGDP  M2  20.82 
NGDP  PGDP  R-FF  15.98 
NGDP  PGDP  R-90  14.88 
NGDP  PGDP  M2  R-90  24.49 
NGDP  PGDP  M2  R-FF  20.87 
NGDP  PGDP  M2  R-90  ZMD  24.98 
NGDP  PGDP  R-90  CP6-G6  26.21 
NGDP  PGDP  R-90  GIO-G1  23.31 
NGDP  PGDP  M2  R-90  POIL  ZMD  28.55 
NGDP  PGDP  M2  R-90  CP6-G6  ZMD  34.02 
NGDP  PGDP  M2  R-90  GIO-GI  ZMD  27.98 
3.28  1.77  79:2  4.71 
6.06  3.81  64:2  7.49 
7.85  6.16  79:2  18.37* 
7.09  4.82  64:2  13.79 
10.61  9.80  79:2  21.85* 
9.70  8.50  79:2  22.84** 
7.11  5.31  74:l  9.58 
9.78  7.16  79:4  16.20 
7.65  4.84  80:2  12.30 
8.21  5.29  74:l  12.33 
10.97  8.87  79:3  24.49** 
10.44  7.46  80:2  20.69 
12.29  9.50  79:3  24.98* 
13.79  10.77  79:2  27.91* 
13.45  10.34  72:l  22.13* 
17.82  14.10*  72:l  29.15* 
15.77  9.77  73:4  21.27* 
15.85  10.82  73:4  22.30 
0.96  0.25  0.58 
0.75  0.09  0.82  0.42 
0.77  0.14  0.99  0.58 
0.67  0.10  0.84  0.47 
0.78  0.13  1.28  0.85 
0.95  0.14  1.20  0.78 
0.98  0.20  1.08 
0.73  0.05  1.31  0.42 
0.99  0.19  1.04  0.12 
0.93  0.19  1.11  0.16 
0.55  0.06  1.43  0.60 
0.62  0.05  1.27  0.46 
1.03  0.15  1.52  0.64 
0.97  0.12  1.55  0.44 
0.94  0.26  1.79  0.65 
1.15  0.27  1.91  0.77 
1.34**  0.52**  2.18  0.82 
1.22*  0.28  1.78  0.82 
Note: The fixed-date Chow test (“Chow”) has a break date of  1979:3. Because this break date is arguably data-dependent,  as discussed in 
the text the critical values for this statistic are difficult to ascertain and the reported significance levels for this statistic (based on the 
standard F distribution)  are at best a rough guide. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Significant at the 1  percent level. 30  Martin Feldstein and James H. Stock 
of the partly endogenous break date). This suggests that the constant term in 
some of these regressions is unstable, but that the coefficients on the stochastic 
regressors do not exhibit statistically significant shifts. The only case in which 
another test rejects at the 10 percent level is for regression 16, which includes 
both the spread CP6-GM6  and the ninety-day Treasury-bill rate FYGM3: the 
AP test rejects with an estimated break in 72:  1. Since no other regression re- 
jects using this statistic, this suggests that there might be some instability in the 
relationship between the commercial paper-Treasury  bill spread and nominal 
output. This spread moves with other private-public spreads (Stock and Watson 
1990); in this light, its instability is consistent with the 5 percent rejection of 
the P-K max statistic in regression 17, which includes the Treasury yield curve 
spread. Aside from these two regressions with the interest rate spreads, the 
results suggest stable regression coefficients on the stochastic variables5 
Overall, the results of this section suggest that the predictive content of M2 
(as well as other financial variables) for nominal GDP is somewhat less over 
the 1970-92  subsample than over the full period. However, formal tests for 
parameter instability fail to reject the hypothesis that the M2-GDP regressions 
have stable coefficients over the thirty-year sample. 
1.6  Links from Other Monetary Aggregates to Nominal GDP 
At various times, the Federal Reserve has considered employing alternative 
financial instruments as control variables, such as the monetary base, MI, and 
interest rates. In this section, we examine the predictive content of these other 
instruments for nominal GDP growth and the stability of these forecasting rela- 
tionships. 
Casual evidence suggests that the link from other monetary aggregates to 
output is less stable. The Federal Reserve is required by law to announce target 
ranges for monetary aggregates. In recent years, the Federal Reserve has pro- 
vided target ranges for M2 and M3 as well as for a broader debt aggregate, but 
it no longer provides a target range for M 1. Federal Reserve officials argue 
that the payment of interest on most checking accounts (a component of M1) 
has increased the substitutability between MI accounts and the components of 
M2 and has therefore greatly increased the volatility of M1 velocity. In the first 
two quarters of  1992, for example, M1 grew at 13.4 percent at annual rates 
while nominal GDP increased only 5 percent. Annual growth rates of the mon- 
etary base and of  nominal GDP, real GDP, and GDP inflation are plotted in 
5. In contrast to the general lack of  rejections in table 1.4, there is more evidence of instability 
in comparable equations which forecast real GDP. The evidence of instability is quite strong when 
GDP inflation is the dependent variable: at least one test rejects at the 5 percent level in ten of the 
twelve regressions involving M2. The estimated break dates occur early in the sample, most com- 
monly 67:2 and 71:l. 31  The Use of  Monetary Aggregate to Target Nominal GDP 
(a)  Annual  Nominal GDP  growth and  Money  Base 
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Fig. 1.2  Four-quarter  growth of (a) nominal GDP (solid line) and the monetary 
base (dashed line); (b) GDP inflation and monetary base; and (c) real GDP and 















Fig. 1.3  Four-quarter  growth of (a) nominal GDP (solid line) and M1 (dashed 
line); (b) GDP inflation and M1; and (c) real GDP and M1,196&92 
,\ 
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figure 1.2. In figure 1.3, the monetary base is replaced by  M1. In contrast to 
figure 1.1, no clear cyclical link is evident between either the base or M1 and 
nominal output. 
To investigate these links more formally, we apply the statistics described in 
section 1.4 and 1.5 to regressions involving base money and M1. Evidence on 
the predictive content of base money and MI is presented in tables 1.5 and 
1.6.6  The most striking feature of these results is that the predictive content of 
these regressions is substantially less than the corresponding regressions with 
M2, with four-quarter R”s  in  the range of  0.09-0.20,  compared with R2’s in 
table 1.1 of almost 0.40. In the regressions with interest rates, the monetary 
base fails to be statistically significant at the 5 percent level, and M1 is no 
longer significant at the 10 percent level. 
The stability of the base, M1, and interest rate regressions is examined in 
table 1.7 and 1.8 using the tests for parameter constancy described in section 
1.5. The hypothesis of  parameter constancy is rejected overwhelmingly for 
base money, with every regression having at least one statistic which rejects 
stability at the 5 percent level. The evidence against stability for M1 is equally 
strong. Interestingly, all the rejections for M1 result from the break-point tests 
rather  than  from  Nyblom’s  (1989) tests for time-varying parameters, sug- 
gesting a regime-shift in the parameters rather than a slow evolution. In both 
the base and MI regressions, the break date is estimated to be in the late 1970s, 
perhaps reflecting the widespread introduction of  interest-bearing checkable 
deposits during this period. In contrast, the regressions with only interest rates 
in table  1.4  suggest that the interest-rate relations are relatively stable. The 
instability of  the base and M1 regressions provides some insight as to why 
the base and M1 are insignificant when interest rates are also included in the 
regressions: even if these variables have predictive content, the nature of that 
predictive content varies over time, and the more stable interest-rate relations 
“drive out” the two narrow monetary aggregates. 
Several conclusions emerge from these results. Neither MI nor the monetary 
base has substantial predictive content for GDP over the full 1959-92 sample, 
and both aggregates are no longer significant once interest rates are included 
in the regressions. Moreover, the link between these two aggregates on the one 
hand and nominal GDP growth on the other is unstable, with the stability tests 
rejecting in most specifications at the 1 percent level. While the link between 
interest rates and GDP growth appears to be more stable (with the exception 
6. The cointegrating residuals ZMD in the regressions in tables 1.6 and 1.7 are based on long- 
run  monetary-base  and  M 1-demand  relations,  respectively,  estimated  using  the  ninety-day 
Treasury-bill rate, using the same estimation procedure applied to the M2 cointegrating vector 
discussed in section 1.4. The interest semielasticities are .0503 (.0172) for base money and .0737 
(.0304)  for MI.  The evidence is weak, however, that the monetary base system is cointegrated, so 
the F-statistics involving ZMD for the base should be interpreted with caution; this term for the 
base is included for comparison with the results for MI and M2. We suspect that these F-statistics 
overstate the predictive content of the base; see Ljungqvist, Park, Stock, and Watson (1988). Table 1.5  Predictive Content of Monetary Base. Dependent Variable: Nominal GDP Growth (estimation period: quarterly, 1960:2 to 1992:2) 
F-tests (p-values)  on Lags of: 
























BASE  R-90 
BASE  R-FF 
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PGDP  BASE 
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PGDP  BASE  R-FF 
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ZMD  0.178 
POIL  ZMD  0.160 
CP6G6  ZMD  0.227 
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2.34  3.46 
(0.077)  (0.019) 
1.85  1.61 
(0.142)  (0.190) 
~~~~~ 
Note: See the note to table  1.1. Table 1.6  Predictive Content of M1. Dependent Variable: Nominal GDP Growth (estimation period: quarterly, 1960:2 to 1992:2) 
F-tests (p-values) on Lags of 
































































ZMD  0.181 
POL  ZMD  0.170 
CP6-G6  ZMD  0.219 
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Note:  See the note to table 1.1. Table 1.7  Tests for Structural Breaks and Time-Varying Parameters with Monetary Base. Dependent Variable: Nominal GDP Growth 
(estimation period: quarterly, 1960:2 to 1992:2) 
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ZMD  53.51*** 
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2.42***  1.11** 
2.37*  1.16 
2.19  0.96 
2.48  1.34 
2.83**  0.95* 
2.66  1.02 
2.44  0.86 
2.86  1.20 
2.91  0.53 
3.09  1.53 
3.17  1.63 
Note: See the note to table I .4. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. Table 1.8  Tests for Structural Breaks and Time-Varying  Parameters with M1. Dependent Variable: Nominal GDP Growth (estimation period: 
quarterly, 19602  to 1992:2) 
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ZMD  50.76*** 
POIL  ZMD  50.23*** 
CP6-G6  ZMD  47.97*** 
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1.53  0.74 
1.62  0.89 
1.41  0.68 
1.91  1.22 
2.31  1.34 
1.90  0.54 
1.89  0.65 
1.68  0.51 
2.90  1.21 
2.99  1.01 
2.88  1.38 
3.04  1.45 
Note: See the note to table 1.4. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 38  Martin Feldstein and James H. Stock 
of the term structure spread), the predictive content of interest rates for nomi- 
nal GDP growth is substantially less than that of M2. 
1.7  Optimal Nominal GDP Growth-Rate Targeting: Performance 
Bounds 
1.7.1  Methodology 
We  now turn to the task of estimating what the volatility of key economic 
variables would be were the Federal Reserve to follow a nominal GDP tar- 
geting rule. Answering hypothetical questions such as this is central to the 
empirical analysis of macroeconomic policies. A standard approach to answer- 
ing such questions, which we employ, is to adopt an empirical macroeconomic 
model, to change one of its equations to reflect the policy rule in question, to 
solve the model with this new equation, and then to compute summary statis- 
tics and counterfactual historical simulations which illustrate the effects of the 
change. In the context of evaluating the effect of nominal GDP targeting, this 
strategy was used by  Taylor (1983, McCallum (1988), and Pecchenino and 
Rasche (1990) to evaluate various targeting rules, although the rules andor 
empirical models used in these studies differed. 
The empirical models we consider are a series of  VAR  models of the form 
(l),  (2), and (3) below. The focus is on constructing performance bounds which 
measure the best outcome the Fed could achieve were it to adopt a nominal 
GDP targeting strategy, relative to the performance of its historical monetary 
policy. As we  discussed in section 1.3, we therefore make three admittedly 
extreme assumptions: that the monetary instrument in question is perfectly 
controllable; that the Fed could adopt the GDP targeting rule which was opti- 
mal over the  1959-92  period; and that changing the rule by  which money 
growth is set does not change the dynamics of the rest of the system and, in 
particular, does not change the relationship between money and output, infla- 
tion, and interest rates. In reality, these assumptions could not be completely 
satisfied, nor in practice could one expect to achieve the performance bound. 
Nonetheless, the computation of  such a bound is a useful step: were the perfor- 
mance bound to indicate little room for improvement beyond historical Fed 
policy, there would be  little reason to  switch to a nominal GDP targeting 
regime. 
To determine the optimal GDP targeting policy, we adopt the objective of 
minimizing the variance of  GDP growth. It should be emphasized that this 
differs from the performance criterion used by McCallum (1988), who exam- 
ined the deviation of the level of nominal GDP from a constant growth path of 
3 percent per year. The key difference is that, by  attempting to stabilize the 
growth rate rather than the level around a constant growth path, we are permit- 
ting base drift in the target. As discussed in section 1.1, not permitting base 
drift has the feature-which  to us seems undesirable-of  leading to a policy 39  The Use of Monetary Aggregate to Target Nominal GDP 
of inflating when nominal GDP is below its target path but is growing stably 
at 3 percent per year, and of tightening when GDP growth is stable at 3 percent 
but GDP is above its target path. 
Because of lags in data availability, the Fed is unable to measure all shocks 
to the economy as they occur. The money control rules considered here there- 
fore set the money-growth rate in the current quarter as a function of economic 
data through the previous quarter.' 
The Optimal Control Rule 
The class of models we work with are VARs of the form 
(1)  x, =  P,  + A,(L)n,-,  + A&)Y,-,  + A,,(L)m,-, + E,, 
(2)  Y, =  Py  + Ayx(L)x,-, + AyJLjY,-, + Ay,(L)m,-i  + Eyt 
(3)  m, = P,  + A,(L)x,-,  + A,y(L)Y,-, + Am(Ljm,-, + Emf, 
where n,  is the growth rate of nominal GDP,  Y, denotes additional variables, 
such as inflation as measured by the GDP deflator, and m, denotes the monetary 
variable of interest, for example, the growth rate of M2. The model dynamics 
are summarized by  the lag polynomials A(L)  and the error covariance matrix, 
C = EE,E,'.  To implement the optimal control algorithms we assume that the 
VAR  is stable, that is, the roots of I-A(L)L  all fall outside the unit circle. To 
simplify exposition we henceforth assume that variables enter as deviations 
from their means so that the intercepts can be omitted. 
The rules considered in this paper are specified in terms of  growth rates of 
money and output. These rules automatically adjust for historical shifts in the 
level of  velocity because target money-growth rates are computed from past 
growth rates rather than levels. These rules do, however, assume a constant 
mean growth of  velocity. Although M2 velocity growth has had a mean  of 
approximately zero over the 1959-92  period, in principle it is desirable to per- 
mit the mean growth rate of velocity to change with interest rates, and to con- 
sider rules which adjust for persistent nonzero growth in velocity. Including a 
levels relation between velocity and the interest rate in (lj, (2),  and (3) is a 
natural way to do this, and the result would be a vector error correction model. 
The empirical results of section 1.4 suggest that this error correction term (the 
long-run money demand residual) should enter this specification. Although 
7. The choice of a one-quarter lag in the money-growth rules represents an attempt to incorpo- 
rate realistic lags in data availability. Many important series are available monthly with no lag or 
lags of at most eight weeks; these include interest rates, employment  and unemployment, industrial 
production, and personal income. However, other key series are available with lags exceeding one 
quarter. In particular, advance GDP estimates are not available until four weeks after the end of 
the quarter, and revised estimates are available later still, so that the availability lag for GDP is at 
least one quarter plus four weeks, arguably longer. The one-quarter availability lag used here 
represents a compromise among these various true availability lags. 40  Martin Feldstein and James H. Stock 
the general nature of the calculations for a vector error correction model are the 
same as for the VAR model analyzed here, the details differ, and the analysis of 
the vector error correction model is beyond the scope of the investigation and 
is left to future research. 
Let Zr = (x,  Y)’,  E,,  = (ex,  E’J’,  A,(L)  = [A,,,@) A,,(L)’I’,  and let Azz(L) 
be the matrix with (1,l) block A&),  (1,2)  block A,#,), (2,l)  block A&),  and 
(2,2)  block AJL).  Then (l),  (2),  and (3) can be rewritten 
(4)  Z, = A,(L)Z,-  I + Azm(L)m,-  I + E, 
(5)  m, =  A,AL>Z,-,  + A,,(Lh-I  + Ern,. 
C&)  = (I -  Z,Azz(L))-l exists. Then (4) can be written 
The roots  of  AdL) are  assumed  to lie outside the  unit  circle,  so that 
(6)  z,  = rw,  + czz(~)~z,3 
where T(L) = C,(L)A,(L).  Let T,,(L)  denote the (1,l)  element of T(L) and 
let CJL) denote the first row of C,(L). 
The optimal control problem is to  choose the  money  growth rule which 
solves 
(7)  min var(x,) = var[Tx,(L)m,_, + Cxz(L)ez,l. 
Because m, is assumed to be a function of data only through the previous quar- 
ter, the solution to this problem has the form m, = ~(L)E~,-,,  where d(L)  solves 
(7). The solution sets 
(8) 
where C;JL) = C;=,  CXz,,,V2,  so m, = $m(L)-~C~z(L)ezI~,  and d(L)  = T,,,,(L)-I 
ClZCW. 
The rule m, = ~(L)E,-  I is expressed in terms of the shocks to the x,  equations 
(4). In terms of implementation, it is more natural to express the rule in terms 
of  actual historical  data. This mathematically  equivalent form of the rule is 
obtained by expressing cZ,-,  in terms of the data using (4). The optimal control 
rule thus is 
(9)  m,-, = ~,X,)Z,-,, 
where hL(I.1 = [I + d(L)A,(L)L]-Id(L)[Z -  A,(L)L]. The controlled system 
is thus given by (4) and (9). 
A primary measure of the performance of  the optimal rule (9) considered 
here is the ratio of the standard deviations of  the variables when the system is 
controlled relative to the standard deviation of the variables when the system 
is uncontrolled.  To make this precise,  let r, denote the ratio of the standard 
deviation of the ith variable in (l),  (2),  and (3)  under the optimal control rule 
to its standard deviation in the uncontrolled  case. Let F(L) denote the mov- 
ing average lag polynomial matrix of the uncontrolled system, that is, F(L) = 
rxm(L)mr-l  + c;z(L)&z,-,  = 0, 41  The Use of Monetary Aggregate to Target Nominal GDP 
(I -  LA(L))-',  whereA(L) is the matrix lag operator with elements A$,),  etc., 
in (l), (2),  and (3).  Let F*(L) denote this matrix when the system is controlled 
using the optimal feedback rule (9), so that F*(L) = [(F&(L)  0)' (FLz(L)  O)']', 
where F?&)  = C&)  + T(L)d(L)L  and FL(L) = d(L)L.  Let Z,:  denote the ith 
variable in Z, when the system is controlled (so that Z,* = F&C)&,).  Finally, 
let e, denote the ith unit vector. Then the performance measure r, is 
(10)  ri = {var(Zf)/var(Z,,)}i 
I 
Econometric Inference 
Because the coefficients of the VAR (I), (2),  and (3)  are unknown, r8  must be 
estimated. A natural estimator of r,, i,  is obtained by substituting the empirical 
estimates of F(L),  F*(L),  and C  into (1  1). However, in evaluating the distribu- 
tion of r,, two sources of uncertainty  need  to be addressed. The first is the 
conventional sampling uncertainty which arises because only estimates of the 
VAR parameters are available. The second source of uncertainty arises because 
for any set of fixed VAR  parameters, different shocks to the system will result 
in different realizations of Zt,  and Z,:,  so that the ratios of the sample variances 
computed using these shocks will differ from the population variances in (10). 
Both sources of uncertainty need to be addressed in estimating the distribution 
of the performance measures. For example, one might wish to know the proba- 
bility of realizing a decade-long sequence of shocks which have the perverse 
effect of  making the optimal policy destabilizing relative to maintaining the 
status quo, that is, the probability of realizing r, as greater than one simply as 
a result of  adverse shocks. 
The statistics reported below estimate the distribution of variance reductions 
which would be realized over a ten-year span were the Fed to adopt the opti- 
mal policy (9). The first source of uncertainty, parameter uncertainty, can be 
handled by  conventional  means. Because  rc is a continuous function  of  the 
unknown VAR  parameters and because those parameters have a joint asymp- 
totic normal distribution, the estimator i,  has an asymptotic normal distribu- 
tion.  In  principle,  this  asymptotic  distribution  can  be computed  using  the 
"delta"  method, although we employ a numerically more convenient technique 
(discussed below). 
The second source of uncertainty, shock uncertainty, can be handled by con- 
sidering the distribution of the sample estimator ?,H,z.h*, 
(12)  F,~.~.~*  = [VWZI;JA,  C, h*)lvk(z,,w, c)$, 
where vk(ZiJA, C))  denotes the sample variance of a realization of Z,, of length 
N (say) generated from the VAR (l),  (2),  and (3)  with parameters A and C,  and 
where vZr(Z!JA, C, h") denotes the corresponding sample variance when Z,; is 42  Martin Feldstein and James H. Stock 
generated from the controlled system (4) and (9) with the parameters A,(L), 
A,(L),  C,,  = E~,E,~’,  and h&(L). With the additional assumption that E, is nor- 
mally distributed N(0, c),  these parameters completely describe the uncon- 
trolled system (l), (2), and (3) and the controlled system (4) and (9). Condi- 
tional on these parameters, the statistic (12) is a ratio of  quadratic forms of 
normal random variables, and a variety of techniques are available for comput- 
ing this conditional distribution. For example, this can be computed by  sto- 
chastic simulation, which is the approach used by  Judd and Motley (1991) to 
estimate ranges of  inflation and output growth produced under McCallum’s 
(1988) monetary base rule (holding constant the model parameters and the 
control rule), and by  Judd and Motley (1992) in their investigation of  using 
interest rates as intermediate targets. 
The measures of uncertainty reported in this and the next section combine 
the parameter and shock uncertainty arising from using the optimal rule (9). 
This was done using Monte Carlo methods. Specifically, in each Monte Carlo 
draw a pseudorandom realization of (A, c)  was drawn from its joint asymptotic 
distribution; F*(L) was computed using the submatrices Az(L)  and A,(L), 
using the estimate of h,(L)  obtained from U.S.  historical data; pseudorandom 
realizations of length N were drawn from stochastic steady states of the con- 
trolled and uncontrolled system; and the sample variance (12) was computed. 
The distribution of these sample variances estimates the distribution of r, given 
hL(L).*  Throughout, N = 40 was used, corresponding to a ten-year span. 
In general the distribution of  is asymmetric (4 by construction is nonnega- 
tive but can be arbitrarily large). The distribution of r!  is therefore summarized 
by  its mean, median, and 10 percent and 90 percent percentiles. In addition, 
the fraction of realizations of rt which would be expected to fall below one- 
that is, to indicate reduced volatility under the control rule-is  also reported. 
1.7.2  Empirical Results 
The optimal control algorithm was applied to two VARs using quarterly data 
over the 1959-92 period. In both models, the optimal rule minimizes the vari- 
ance of  quarterly nominal GDP growth, with  M2 as the instrument. Both 
modes include quarterly growth in GDP, quarterly inflation as measured by the 
GDP deflator, the quarterly growth of interest rates, and the quarterly growth 
of  M2. This use of  growth rates of  interest rates, rather than their changes, 
differs from the specifications of sections 1.4 and 1.5. While this modification 
has a negligible effect on the estimated distributions of the performance meas- 
ures, it prevents interest rates from taking on negative values in the simulations 
used to compute the performance measures. 
8. Technically, to compute the conditional distribution we would need to draw A(L)  from the 
conditional distribution of A(L)  given h:=(L), where h,&)  is given by the expression following 
(9). Instead, A(L)  was drawn from its unconditional distribution. Sampling from the conditional 
distribution with these nonlinear restrictions would be computationally prohibitive and is beyond 
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Estimated performance measures and their distributions are reported in table 
1.9 for two systems. Because the objective is to minimize the variance of nomi- 
nal  GDP  growth, these ratios  represent performance bounds  for  nominal 
GDP growth. 
First consider the system in panel A. The point estimate of  rcDp  is 0.840, 
but the mean and median of the distribution of ten-year realizations of  rcDP  is 
somewhat larger, approximately 0.88. The mean ratio for four-quarter growth 
in GDP drops to 0.76. While the spread of the distribution also increases, the 
90 percent point remains approximately constant, and the fraction of realiza- 
tions of  r,,,  under one is approximately 90 percent. In short, over a ten-year 
span the expected effect of the optimal GDP rule would be to reduce the stan- 
dard deviation of annual GDP growth by one-fourth; in nine out of ten decade- 
long spans the optimal rule would result in at least some reduction in the vari- 
ance of nominal GDP. 
The reductions in the volatility of real GDP and GDP inflation (not shown 
in the table) are less than for nominal GDP. At the four-quarter horizon, the 
GDP targeting rule results in a mean improvement of only 6.6 percent for in- 
flation and 12.6 percent for real GDP. However, in two-thirds of the simulated 
decades the volatility of inflation is reduced, while in three-fourths of the de- 
cades the volatility of real GDP growth is reduced. 
The main findings from this exercise are robust to using the funds rate rather 
than the ninety-day Treasury-bill rate as the financial variable. In this system, 
Table 1.9  Estimated Performance under Optimal GDP Targeting Rule 
(ratio of standard deviations of quarterly, semiannual, and annual 
growth rates, controlled versus uncontrolled system, over a 
ten-year span) 
Standard 
Variable  Aggregation  i  Mean  Deviation  Median  10% Point  90% Point  Fraction 
A. Y = (GDP, PGDP, R-90); control =  M2 
GDP  1  0.840  0.881  0.109  0.887  0.752  1.010  0.88 
2  0.762  0.824  0.147  0.824  0.644  1.001  0.90 
4  0.668  0.761  0.202  0.748  0.519  1.019  0.89 
B. Y = (NGDP, PGDP, R-FF); control =  M2 
GDP  1  0.851  0.900  0.115  0.903  0.762  1.034  0.83 
2  0.788  0.855  0.151  0.852  0.677  1.041  0.84 
4  0.699  0.788  0.205  0.774  0.542  1.039  0.87 
Nore: The entry in the third column is the estimated reduction in the standard deviation of  the 
variable given in the first column, temporally aggregated over the number of quarters given in the 
second column, for the system controlled using the optimal controller derived for the indicated 
control variable. The remaining columns summarize the distribution of the sample realizations of 
r, over a ten-year span were the optimal rule, computed using the 1960-92  data, implemented in 
the future; these distributions incorporate both parameter and shock uncertainty, as discussed in 
the text. Data transformations are as given in the appendix. Estimation period:  1960:2-1992:2. 
Based on 2000 Monte Carlo replications. 44  Martin Feldstein and James H. Stock 
the optimal monetary policy still reduces nominal GDP volatility in 83 percent 
to 87 percent of the decades, depending on the horizon, The mean reductions 
for inflation volatility and real GDP volatility are again more modest than those 
of nominal GDP. However, the optimal policy results in reductions of the vola- 
tility of annual inflation and real output in, respectively, three-fifths and three- 
fourths of the simulated decades. 
1.7.3  Counterfactual Historical Simulations and Interpretation 
Supposing the Fed had optimally used M2 to reduce GDP volatility, how 
might the economy have performed over the 1959-92  period? Answering this 
question both is of interest in its own right and provides a vehicle for illustrat- 
ing the dynamic interactions in the model. Because the VAR captures the his- 
torical  correlations between  lagged money  and future  output, it is a useful 
framework for computing  the performance  bounds reported  in the previous 
section. It is, however, arguably less well suited for performing counterfactual 
simulations, for several reasons. The model does not impose any restrictions 
implied by economic theory and thus is at a minimum inefficiently estimated; 
because  structural shocks are not identified  (in the  sense of  structural VAR 
60  64  68  72  76  ao  84  8a  92  96 
Fig. 1.4  Actual and simulated historical values of four-quarter growth of 
nominal GDP  Optimal nominal GDP targeting rule, 1960-92 
Noir: Actual: solid line; simulation: dashed line. 45  The Use of Monetary Aggregate to Target Nominal GDP 
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Fig. 1.5  Impulse response functions: optimal GDP targeting rule 
Note:  Response of  money growth after k quarters, relative to its mean, to a one-standard- 
deviation shock in the equations for nominal GDP (solid line); GDP  inflation (dashed line); the 
interest rate (dotted-dashed line). 
analysis), simulated responses to shocks are difficult to interpret. Nonetheless, 
the computation of  counterfactual simulations sheds light on  the  dynamic 
properties of the model. 
With these caveats in mind, we therefore simulate the path of nominal GDP 
under the optimal policy rule. The simulated path is computed using the histor- 
ical shocks to the first three equations in the system, with M2 determined using 
the ex post optimal control rule. This simulated path, computed from the sys- 
tem in panel A of table 1.9, is plotted in figure 1.4 along with the actual path 
of GDP. The optimal policy rule would have produced markedly different paths 
of  money and interest rates, but only somewhat different paths of  nominal 
GDP, real GDP, and inflation, relative to the actual data. 
A convenient way  to summarize the optimal control rule is in terms of its 
impulse response function to shocks to GDP, inflation, and interest rate; this 
impulse response function is d(L)  given following (8). The change in the log 
of  money in response to a one-standard deviation error in each of  the three 
equations for the other system variables is plotted in figure 1.5. These shocks 
have not been orthogonalized so the impulse responses have no ready structural 
interpretation. However, for a given system this impulse response facilitates the 
comparison of the optimal rule to the simpler rule examined in the next section. 46  Martin Feldstein and James H. Stock 
1.8  Performance of Alternative M2 Growth Rules 
1.8.1  Simpler Nominal GDP Targeting Rules 
The optimal rule provides a bound by  which to gauge the potential perfor- 
mance of  alternative nominal GDP targeting schemes. As practical advice, 
however, the rule has some shortcomings. It involves multiple lags of  several 
variables and thus would be rather complicated to follow. More important, the 
optimal rule depends on the specified model; because all empirical models are 
best thought of as approximations, as long as these approximations “fit” (for 
example, forecast out-of-sample) equally well, there is no compelling reason 
to choose the optimal rule from any one model. Thus, it is natural to wonder 
whether there are simpler money-growth rules which would result in a perfor- 
mance nearly as good as that achieved by the optimal rule, but are simpler to 
explain and to implement and do not hinge on any one model specification. 
In  this section we  therefore consider alternative, simpler models for tar- 
geting nominal GDP.  In  doing so, we  parallel the investigations of  simple 
money-growth rules by  Taylor (1985), McCallum (1988), Hess, Small, and 
Brayton (1992), and Judd and Motley (1991) and extend this work to the distri- 
bution of  the performance measures r,. The money-growth rules considered 
here have the partial adjustment form 
(13)  (m, -  P,)  = UP, -  xr-J + (1 -  A)(m,-, -  PJ, 
where px is the target growth rate of nominal GDP, F,  is the mean money- 
growth rate, and 0 <  A < 1. Thus money growth adjusts by a fraction A when 
realized GDP growth in the previous quarter deviates from its target value by 
the amount p, -  x,-, . 
It was suggested in section 1.4 that long-run money demand is well charac- 
terized as a cointegrating relationship between money, nominal GDP, and inter- 
est rates, with a unit income elasticity. If  interest rates are 1(1) with no drift 
(an empirically and economically plausible specification), velocity growth has 
mean zero. Thus p,,  is set to equal px,  and the rule (13) simplifies to m, = 
-Ax-,  + (1 -  A)m,-,.  As in  section 1.7, the rule (13) is implemented in its 
deviations-from-means form, so that m, and x, are taken to be deviations from 
their 1960 to 1992 averages. 
The effect of  the partial adjustment money-growth rule (13) can be evalu- 
ated using the techniques of section 1.7.1. For example, the formulas (10) and 
(11) for the performance measure ri  are as described in section 1.7.1, except 
that the rule (13) replaces the optimal rule (9). Econometric inference concern- 
ing the performance measure can also be performed using the procedure de- 
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1.8.2  Empirical Results 
The partial adjustment rule (13) was examined on a coarse grid of values of 
A between .  1 and .5. In general, the performance measures ri  were insensitive 
to the choice of A for .2 5 A 5  .4;  within this range, no value of A dominated 
in terms of variance reduction at all horizons. The results for A = .4 are shown 
in table 1.10 for the two systems analyzed in table 1.9. 
The striking conclusion from table 1.10 is that this simple partial adjustment 
rule produces nearly the same distributions of performance measures as does 
the optimal rule. The partial adjustment rule results in a somewhat lower frac- 
tion of simulated decades of improved performance for nominal GDP at the 
quarterly horizon-only  70 percent, compared with 88 percent under the opti- 
mal rule-but  85 percent of the simulated decades have reduced annual nomi- 
nal  GDP volatility. As is the case under the optimal rule, under the partial 
adjustment rule the improvements in inflation and real output variability are 
less than for nominal GDP. However, the partial adjustment rule still results in 
improvements in inflation and output in two-thirds of the simulated decades. 
The results in panel B of table 1.10 indicate that these findings are robust to 
replacing the ninety-day Treasury-bill rate with the funds rate. Overall, ac- 
cording to these performance measures the simple rule comes close to achiev- 
ing the reduction in nominal GDP volatility of the optimal rule and is robust 
to changing the interest rate used in the specification. 
1.8.3  Counterfactual Historical Simulations and Interpretation 
The fact that the simple rule approximates the optimal rule suggests that the 
counterfactual historical values simulated using the partial adjustment rule will 
Table 1.10  Estimated Performance under Partial Adjustment GDP Targeting 
Rule (ratio of standard deviations of quarterly, semiannual, and 
annual growth rates, controlled versus uncontrolled system, over a 
ten-year span) 
Standard  Fraction 
Variable  Aggregation  i  Mean  Deviation  Median  10% Point  90% Point  < 1 
A. Y = (GDP, PGDP, R-90); control = M2 
GDP  1  0.882  0.932  0.124  0.933  0.780  1.083  0.70 
2  0.818  0.901  0.173  0.899  0.686  1.122  0.73 
4  0.659  0.779  0.213  0.762  0.527  1.060  0.85 
B. Y = (NGDP, PGDP, R-FF); control = M2 
GDP  1  0.881  0.923  0.112  0.928  0.789  1.051  0.77 
2  0.818  0.890  0.156  0.889  0.698  1.079  0.77 
4  0.683  0.790  0.199  0.777  0.549  1.043  0.87 
Note: Ratios of  standard deviations were computed using the partial adjustment nominal GDP 
targeting rule, rn, = -AqI + (1 -  A)m,-,,  where A = .4, as discussed in the text. See the note to 
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Fig. 1.6  Actual and simulated historical values of four-quarter  growth of 
nominal GDP: Partial-adjustment  GDP targeting rule, 1960-92 
Note: Actual: solid line: simulation: dashed line. 
be close to the counterfactual values based on the optimal rule. This is in fact 
the case. The actual and simulated values of annual GDP growth for the system 
with the ninety-day Treasury-bill rate are plotted in figure 1.6. A comparison 
of  figures 1.4 and  1.6 reveals only slight differences between the historical 
values of output growth under the two rules; perhaps the largest difference is 
the decline in output in 1972 under the partial adjustment rule. 
The impulse responses of the partial adjustment rule are plotted in figure 
1.7. (These impulse responses are the lag polynomial 4151 in the representation 
m,  = d[L]&,,  which is obtained by  solving [4] and [13]; the plotted impulse 
responses are scaled by  the standard deviation of  cZir,  and  so represent re- 
sponses to one-standard-deviation  changes in czr.)  Although the simulated out- 
put  and  inflation paths are quite similar under the  two  rules,  the  impulse 
responses of the rules are quite different. Clearly the partial adjustment rule is 
not an approximation of the optimal rule, in the sense that its impulse response 
function approximates the impulse response function of the optimal rule. How- 
ever, its effect on nominal output (and also on inflation and real output) is 
close to that of  the optimal rule. A partial explanation for this is that, as was 
emphasized in section 1.4, the estimates of the short-run effect of money on 
output, while statistically significant, are still rather small, small enough that 49  The Use of Monetary Aggregate to Target Nominal GDP 
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Fig. 1.7  Impulse response functions: partial-adjustment  GDP targeting rule 
Note: Response of money growth after k quarters, relative to its mean, to a one-standard- 
deviation shock in the equations for nominal GDP (solid line); GDP inflation (dashed line); the 
interest rate (dotted-dashed line). 
rather different money-growth paths can have similar, modest effects on nomi- 
nal output and inflation. More generally, these results indicate that the objective 
function of the variance of nominal GDP is rather flat with respect to various 
money-growth rules.9 
1.9  Adjusting Monetary Policy to Consensus Forecasts 
The empirical analysis in sections 1.7 and 1.8 uses a simple VAR  model 
to derive and to evaluate policy rules. This analysis assumes that these low- 
dimensional models adequately capture stable historical correlations and that 
the remaining predictable structure in GDP is limited. If  the VARs have per- 
formed worse than alternative forecasting systems, then one would be reluctant 
to place much weight on them in designing or  evaluating monetary policy. 
This section assesses the predictive performance of our simple VAR  model by 
comparing it to professional economic forecasts: had our simple VAR  models 
been run historically, would they have produced forecasts of nominal GDP as 
9. It does not follow that any money-growth rule results in modest improvements. For example, 
letting m,  = .4x, + .6m,_,  (so that money growth increases when nominal output is above its target) 
is destabilizing and results in a point estimate of four-quarter rCDP  of 1.70. 50  Martin Feldstein and James H. Stock 
good as the historical professional record? McNees’s (1986) comparison of ex 
ante forecasts indicates that, at least for some economic variables, VARs are 
capable of performing as well as or better than conventional professional fore- 
casting models. The VARs examined in McNees’s study, however, are struc- 
tured differently from and have more variables than our models, so his work 
does not directly address ours. 
We  therefore provide evidence on how our models would have performed 
over  this  period,  relative  to  those  of  private  forecasters.  Of  course,  the 
main problem with such an exercise is that our models have been estimated 
on  the  full sample while the forecasters were  operating in  real  time  with 
all the difficulties that entails. Thus a comparison of  our full-sample VAR 
with real-time forecasts would be  quite unfair. Consequently, we  examine 
pseudo out-of-sample forecasts from recursive regressions with the variables 
in our VARs, with the initial forecast quarter ranging from 1971:l to 1991:2. 
For example, the forecast of GDP growth from 1971:  1 to 1972:l is computed 
on the basis of  a regression estimated for the period from 1960:2 to 1971:l; 
the 1971:2-1972:2 forecast is based on data for 1960:2-1971:2;  and so forth. 
The systems used are those in the previous two sections, with nominal income, 
inflation, M2, and the ninety-day Treasury-bill rate; systems where M2 and 
then the interest rate are dropped; and a system in which oil prices are in- 
cluded. 
The professional forecasts considered are the DRI (Data Resources, Inc.) 
and the ASA-NBER forecasts. The DRI forecasts are “early in quarter fore- 
casts’’ released approximately four weeks into the first quarter of the year being 
forecasted. The survey date of the ASA-NBER survey has varied historically 
but is typically between four and six weeks into the first quarter being fore- 
casted. (The DRI and ASA-NBER professional forecasts are of  four-quarter 
GNP and are evaluated relative to four-quarter GNP growth.) For comparison 
we  also present the “constant” forecast, in which the forecast is simply the 
average four-quarter growth rate of nominal GDP over the 197  1  :  1-1992:2  in- 
terval. 
The RMSEs of the recursive VAR  forecasts and of the professional forecast- 
ers are given in table 1.11. The RMSE for the DRI and ASA-NBER forecasts 
are very similar at 2.26. A comparison with the “constant” forecast shows that 
the forecasts reduce the mean square error (the square of RMSE) by approxi- 
mately  one-third. The  simple  three-lag  recursive  regression  that  includes 
lagged values of M2, real GDP, and the GDP deflator (line 3 of table 1.11) has 
an RMSE of 2.37. Adding lagged three-month interest rates reduces the RMSE 
to 2.26, the same as the DRI and ASA-NBER forecasts. With the addition of 
oil prices, the RMSE of the VAR  forecasts is actually slightly lower than the 
RMSE of the DRI and ASA-NBER forecasts. 
The conclusion from table 1.1  1 is that the variables used in sections 1.7 and 
1.8 in fact predict nominal GDP with the same accuracy as either the median 
of private forecasters in the ASA-NBER survey or the forecasts issued by the 51  The Use of Monetary Aggregate to Target Nominal GDP 
Table 1.11  RMSEs of Forecast of Four-Quarter Growth in Nominal Output, 
1971:l to 1991:2 
Forecasting System  RMSE 
Constant only: 71:2-91:2  sample 
Recursive time-series  forecasts 
1.  Constant 
2. VAR(3): RGDP, PGDP 
3. VAR(3): RGDP, PGDP, FM2 
4. VAR(3): RGDP, PGDP, FM2, FYGM3 
5. VAR(3): RGDP, PGDP, FM2, FYGM3, POIL 
Professional forecasts 
6. DRI, 4-quarter 









Note: All  RMSEs refer  to annual forecasts  made from  1971:l  to  1991:2. For the time-series 
models, the forecasts are of nominal GDP growth, computed using recursive regression with three 
lags of the indicated variable. For example, the forecast of GDP growth from 71: 1 to 72: 1 in model 
2 was computed by regressing ln(GDPJGDP,-,)  onto (1, z,-~, z,_,,  z,-J,  where z, is quarterly real 
GDP growth and quarterly inflation in quarter t, with a regression period of  1960:2-1971:1  with 
earlier observations for initial conditions; for the 7 1:2  forecast, the regressions were reestim- 
ated using data through 71:2, etc. The DRI and ASA-NBER forecasts are of four-quarter GNP 
and are evaluated relative to four-quarter  GNP growth. The entry in the first line uses as the 
forecast the average four-quarter growth rate of nominal GDP over 71:l-91:2,  so this RMSE is 
&nyl,/.  times the standard deviation of four-quarter output growth over 71:l-91:2. 
DRI. Of course, despite the use of recursive forecasts this is not a true compari- 
son of ex ante forecasts: we have the advantage of using the final rather than 
the preliminary values of the data and have drawn on the past decade of experi- 
ence with VARs to specify our model. Also, our models are silent on one main 
feature of most professionally used models, the forecasting of the detailed 
components of real output. Still, the results are sufficiently encouraging to lead 
us to conclude that the systems simulated in  sections 1.7 and  1.8 provide a 
plausible empirical framework for the discussion of alternative monetary pol- 
icy rules. 
1.10  The Federal Reserve’s Ability to Control M2 
Although the Federal Reserve announces broad annual target ranges for M2 
growth, the actual growth of M2 in 1992 was below the bottom of the target 
range and in 1991 was at the very bottom of the range. In both years the target 
range was  2.5 percent to 6.5 percent; actual M2 growth was  2.7 percent in 
1991 and 2.2 percent in  1992. Both years had substantial periods of  zero or 
negative growth of M2. 
Federal Reserve officials emphasize that they do not control M2 directly. To 
the extent that the Fed wants to alter M2, it proceeds indirectly based on an 
estimated statistical relationship between M2 and the federal funds rate. If the 52  Martin Feldstein and James H. Stock 
level of M2 projected by that relationship lies below the desired level, open- 
market purchases could be used to lower the federal funds rate until the pro- 
jected level of M2 is satisfactory. This might of course cause a conflict between 
those who focus on the M2 targets and those who focus on how changes in the 
federal funds rate affect inflation and real economic activity and thus regard 
M2 as only a coincident indicator of nominal GDP rather  than  as a policy 
instrument that causes future changes in nominal GDP. 
Such a conflict did not arise during 1991 and  1992, however, because the 
Federal Reserve's statistical relation consistently overestimated the level of M2 
that would result from the existing federal funds rate. Many Federal Reserve 
officials who wanted to see a higher level of M2 believed that M2 was about 
to increase more rapidly  without the need for the future stimulus of a lower 
federal funds rate (and the associated increase in reserves). 
The Fed's indirect and inaccurate approach to controlling M2 is currently 
necessary because the link between Federal Reserve policy and the M2 money 
stock has become very different from the standard textbook picture.'" In the 
textbook world, banks must keep reserves in proportion to their liabilities, that 
is, in proportion to the noncurrency portion of the stock of money. When Fed- 
eral Reserve open-market purchases of Treasury bills increase bank reserves, 
banks are automatically induced to increase the noncurrency component of the 
money stock in proportion to the increase in reserves. 
In reality, however, banks are now required to hold reserves against only a 
small fraction of their liabilities. Since reserves are no longer required for time 
deposits and certain other liabilities, reserve requirements apply to only about 
20 percent of total M2. An open-market purchase of securities by the Fed auto- 
matically leads to a rise in M1 (since reserves are required for almost all of the 
noncurrency components of M1) but does not necessarily cause a rise in M2. 
In practice, the banks have responded to increases in reserves by substituting 
low-cost  MI funds  (checkable  deposits) for the more expensive M2 funds 
(time deposits). As a result, M1 grew very rapidly during 1991 and 1992 while 
M2 grew at less than the targeted level. 
It is possible that a more aggressive trial and error procedure for adjusting 
reserves (or the Federal funds rate) might allow the Fed to achieve its desired 
level of M2 within each quarter. Fed officials doubt this, however, asserting 
that the lag between  changes in the Federal funds rate and the subsequent 
change in M2 is much longer than a quarter. The Fed could eventually achieve 
the desired M2 level by trial and error changes in reserves but could not do so 
in each quarter. 
This problem could be avoided and the Federal Reserve could reassert con- 
trol over the quarterly level of M2 if reserve requirements were expanded to all 
the components of M2. Throughout most of the history of the Federal Reserve 
System, banks were required to maintain reserves against both demand depos- 
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its and time deposits. But the ratio of reserves to deposits has been reduced 
since the 1970s, with the reserve requirements on personal time deposits elimi- 
nated in 1980 and on nonpersonal time deposits in 1990. 
The Federal Reserve has reduced reserve-requirement ratios and eliminated 
the reserve requirements on time deposits to eliminate the implicit tax that is 
otherwise levied on the banks. Because the Federal Reserve pays no interest 
on the funds that the banks deposit as required reserves, the reserve require- 
ments act as a tax on bank deposits. This tax was particularly heavy in the 
1970s and early  1980s, when inflation caused short-term interest rates to be 
very  high. The “reserve requirement tax” made it  particularly difficult for 
banks to attract deposits after the creation of money market mutual funds, since 
such funds are not subject to reserve requirements at all. More recently, the 
Federal Reserve reduced the reserve requirement tax as a way  of temporarily 
increasing bank profitability at a time when banks are under pressure to in- 
crease capital. 
Because the Federal Reserve is precluded by law from paying interest on 
reserves, it has chosen to reduce and eliminate reserve requirements as the only 
way of reducing the reserve requirement tax. If Congress had responded to the 
higher short-term interest environment of the 1970s and 1980s by  permitting 
the Federal Reserve to pay interest on required reserves and by extending re- 
serve requirements to personal deposits, the Fed would have been able to main- 
tain reserve requirements on all the types of  bank deposits in M2 and would 
therefore be better able to control M2 directly. 
Extending reserve requirements to time deposits so that all of M2 is subject 
to the same reserve requirement, while paying interest on those additional re- 
quired reserves, would have no economic or financial impact as such but would 
give the Federal Reserve the ability to control M2 from quarter to quarter.” 
Since the banks would obtain the needed additional reserves by selling Trea- 
sury bills to the Federal Reserve, this open-market operation would neutralize 
the otherwise contractionary macroeconomic effect of the increase in reserve 
requirements. If the interest rate paid on the additional reserves were the same 
as the Treasury-bill rate, the interest the banks would receive on the additional 
required reserves would just balance the interest they  would otherwise have 
collected on the Treasury bills that they sell to obtain those additional reserves; 
the banks would thus be neither better nor worse off financially as a result of 
the increased reserve requirements. Similarly, since the Federal Reserve would 
pay  in interest on the additional reserves the same amount it receives on the 
Treasury bills acquired through the associated open-market operations, there 
would be no effect on the budget of the Federal Reserve and therefore no effect 
on the budget of the federal government. The only effect would be to increase 
the ability of the Federal Reserve to control M2. 
Achieving accurate control of M2 requires that the same reserve require- 
11. This point is developed in Feldstein (1991) 54  Martin Feldstein and James H. Stock 
ment apply to all of the components of M2. The Federal Reserve has histori- 
cally imposed substantially lower reserve requirements on time deposits than 
on demand deposits on the theory that the time deposits were less liquid and 
that banks therefore required fewer reserves for prudential and liquidity pur- 
poses. It is important to emphasize that such considerations are irrelevant in 
the current context. The reserve requirements must be set uniformly in order 
to give the Federal Reserve control over the M2 money stock, not to assure 
that  the  banks  have  adequate  liquid  reserves.  Since  paying  interest  on 
time  deposits  would  mean  that  this  increase  in  the  reserve requirements 
on such accounts would have no impact on the profitability of the banks or 
on the budget of  the government, there is no problem with having reserve 
requirements on  time deposits that are high  by  historic standards. Failure 
to  do  so is  likely to  mean  Federal Reserve  inability to  control quarterly 
changes in M2. 
1.11  Conclusion 
This paper has studied the possibility of using M2 to target the quarterly 
rate of  growth of  nominal GDP.  The evidence we  present indicates that the 
Federal Reserve could probably guide M2 in a way that reduces not only the 
long-term average rate of  inflation but also the variance of  the annual GDP 
growth rate. 
The statistical tests we present show that M2 is a useful predictor of nominal 
GDP. We cannot reject the assumption of parameter stability over time using a 
variety of tests that permit the data to determine a point at which parameter 
changes occur. 
A simple optimizing model based on a VAR reduces the mean ten-year stan- 
dard deviation of  annual GDP growth by over 20 percent. Although there is 
uncertainty about this value because of both parameter uncertainty and sto- 
chastic shocks to the economy, we estimate a probability of more than 85 per- 
cent that the annual variance would be reduced over a ten-year period. A much 
simpler policy based on a single equation linking M2 and nominal GDP is 
shown to be almost as successful in reducing this annual GDP variance. The 
evidence thus contradicts those who assert that there is no stable relation be- 
tween nominal GDP and M2 and those who, like Milton Friedman, have ar- 
gued that the relation is so unstable in the short run that it cannot be used to 
reduce the variance of nominal GDP. Our empirical models are too simplified 
for us to recommend either of the rules considered as a normative and quantita- 
tive prescription for monetary policy; at a minimum the analysis would need 
to be extended to handle data revisions, frequency of data availability, and ad- 
ditional predictive variables. We  have argued, however, that our main conclu- 
sion-that  controlling M2 growth can result in substantial reductions in the 
volatility of GDP growth-is  robust to the details of our empirical model and 
policy rule. 
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M2, there are two possible problems in implementing this strategy. First, the 
Federal Reserve does not currently control M2 directly. We  show that the link 
between the monetary base, which the Fed now controls, and nominal GDP is 
too weak and erratic to provide a reliable instrument for targeting nominal 
GDP. We  explain, however, that the Federal Reserve could control quarterly 
M2 growth completely by extending reserve requirements to all of the compo- 
nents of M2. 
Second, we cannot be certain that a shift of  Fed policy to control M2 in 
this way would not change the basic reduced-form parameters linking M2 and 
nominal GDP. We  take some comfort from the fact that the many changes in 
financial institutions and Federal Reserve procedures during our thirty-year 
sample period did not cause significant parameter instability. These two issues 
cannot be  resolved by  empirical research. The reader will  have  to  decide 
whether either is likely to be an insuperable problem. We hope not. 
This research has encouraged us to extend our investigation in several ways. 
On a technical level, the simulations do not allow for a slowly changing mean 
growth of velocity which would be linked to long-run trends in interest rates. 
The Granger causality tests suggested that introducing this additional error- 
correction term (the long-run money demand residual) was  empirically war- 
ranted. This leads us to speculate that replacing the VARs in sections 1.7 and 
1.8 with  vector error correction models will improve the estimated perfor- 
mance of the money rules and will produce more meaningful simulations by 
tying together velocity and interest rate movements. 
The objective analyzed here has been to reduce the variance of  quarterly 
nominal GDP growth. An  alternative rule with considerable appeal is one in 
which the objective is to minimize the expected square of the GDP gap, that 
is, the deviation of GDP from potential GDP. An example of  this is the “hy- 
brid” rule studied in Hall and Mankiw’s contribution to this volume (chap. 2). 
An  alternative objective would be to minimize the one-sided shortfall of  real 
GDP from the estimated level of potential GDP. In either case, these alternative 
objectives would result in monetary policies which are more aggressive when 
the GDP gap is  larger, in particular producing relatively more expansionary 
monetary policy at a cyclical trough. 
Central bankers object to strict rules for controlling M2 because they do not 
like the increased variability of  short-term interest rates which would result. 
An  idea worth investigating would therefore be a monetary policy rule that 
includes short-term interest-rate changes as part of the criterion function, for 
example, a weighted average of the change in the nominal or real GDP growth 
rate and in the level of the short-term interest rate. 
International experience shows that central banks prefer to define their goal 
as price stability rather than the control of nominal GDP. It would be interest- 
ing to examine the effects on nominal and real GDP stability of  alternative 
monetary policy rules that sought to adjust M2 growth in a way that achieved 
a desired level of inflation in the medium term. 
We expect to return to these important issues in a future paper. 56  Martin Feldstein and James H. Stock 
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Gross  domestic  product  (seasonally  adjusted, 
current-year dollars) 
Gross domestic product: implicit price deflator 
Real gross domestic product (NGDPPGDP) 
Money stock: M2 (Citibase series FM2) 
Monetary base, adjusted for changes in required 
reserves  (constructed  by  the  Federal  Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis; seasonally adjusted) (Citibase 
series FMBASE) 
Interest rate: U.S. Treasury bills, secondary mar- 
ket, three month (percent per annum) (Citibase 
series FYGM3) 
Interest rate: Federal funds (percent per annum) 
(Citibase series FYFF) 
Interest rate: U.S. Treasury bonds with constant 
one-year maturity (percent per annum) (Citibase 
series FYGT1) 
Interest rate: U.S. Treasury bonds with constant 
ten-year maturity (percent per annum) (Citibase 
series FYGTlO) 
R-1OYR minus R-1YR 
Six-month commercial  paper  rate  minus  six- 
month  U.S. Treasury-bill rate  (using  Citibase 
definitions, CP6 -GM6  = FYCP-FYGM6) 
Producer price index: crude petroleum (value is 
set to 100 in 1982) (Citibase series PW561) 
Residual from M2 money demand cointegrating 
relation (unit income elasticity) as discussed in 
the text 
All data are taken from Citibase. All data are quarterly. Monthly data (interest 
rates and money supply data) were aggregated to the quarterly level by  averag- 
ing the data for the months within the quarter. 
Data Transformations 
Unless explicitly stated otherwise the data are used after the following trans- 
formations: NGDP, PGDP, RGDP, and POIL enter in first differences of loga- 
rithms, and interest rates (R-90, R-FF) enter in first differences. There are three 
exceptions to this general rule. The long-run money demand cointegrating rela- 57  The Use of Monetary Aggregate to Target Nominal GDP 
tions discussed in section 1.4 are specified between log velocity and the level 
of interest rates. Error correction terms (the money demand error ZMD and the 
interest rate spreads CP6 -GM6  and GI0 -GI) enter the regressions and tests 
in sections 1.4, 1.5, and  1.6 in levels. In  the VARs  in sections 1.7 and  1.8, 
interest rates appear in growth rates (first log differences) rather than first dif- 
ferences. 
Appendix B 
Tests  for Parameter Stability 
This appendix summarizes the construction and asymptotic distribution theory 
of the tests for parameter stability employed in sections 1.5 and 1.6. The tests 
apply to the standard time-series regression model, modified to incorporate the 
possibility of  nonconstant parameters: 
(B1) 
where E, is a homoskedastic martingale difference sequence with variance u2. 
The k-  1 stochastic regressors x,  are assumed to be mean zero and integrated of 
order zero (I(0)).  Under the assumption that the regressors are I(O), the assump- 
tion that they have mean zero is made without loss of generality under the null, 
since a constant is included in the regression. (Under the alternative of chang- 
ing coefficients, the transformation to mean  zero regressors can always be 
done, but it changes the time-variation process of the intercept so the power of 
the tests discussed below is not invariant to demeaning the data although the 
asymptotic size is.) Additional technical conditions are needed to obtain for- 
mal distribution theory for these tests. These conditions are typically weak: for 
example, that the sample x,  covariance matrix is consistent for a positive defi- 
nite matrix; that x,  has at least four moments; and that the partial sum process 
constructed from E, obeys a functional central limit theorem. Note that x, may 
include lagged y,, assuming there are no unit roots in the y,  process. 
The stability tests employed in sections 1.5 and 1.6 examine the hypothesis 
that  the parameters a and  p are constant, against the alternative that  they 
change one more times during the sample. The tests fall into three classes: 
Chow-type tests for a break at a single, unknown date; CUSUM-type tests; 
and Nyblom’s (1989) tests of time-varying parameters. These three classes of 
tests are described in turn. 
y, = a,  + p,’x, + E,, t = 1,.  . . ,  7: 
Chow-Type Break-Point Tests 
ternative, 
These statistics test the null hypothesis, H,: (a,,  p,) = (a,  p), against the al- 58  Martin Feldstein and James H. Stock 
(B2)  H,:  (a,,  6,) = (a,  61, t 5 k; = (fi, p), t >  k, 
where k is an unknown  date,  1 I  k 5 T  Were k known a priori, then  the 
appropriate test statistic would be the Wald test of parameter constancy, that 
is, the Chow test,  say FAk). Because k  is unknown,  a natural  modification 
would be the maximum of these, say max kcr,o. T-,O,FT(k),  where to  reflects initial 
and terminal values for which the test is not evaluated. This modification was 
proposed by Quandt (1960) and is termed the Quandt likelihood ratio (QLR) 
statistic (we return to QLR terminology although the test is implemented here 
as a maximal Wald, not LR, statistic). Optimal tests against the alternative (B2) 
were studied by Andrews and Ploberger (1991). No uniformly most powerful 
test exists in this problem, even asymptotically and with normal errors, so dif- 
ferent tests are powerful against different alternatives. Two alternative statistics 
they propose  are the mean  of the F-statistics  (in general a weighted mean, 
which  has an interpretation  as an LM statistic) and an exponential average 
of the F-statistics,  the so-called exponential Wald statistics (which are most 
powerful against distant local alternatives in a sense made precise in Andrews 
and Ploberger 1991). The three Chow-type statistics thus considered here are 
T-f 




AP exp-W = ln((T -  2tn)-' 2  exp((FT(k)/2))]. 
k=tO  035) 
Because these tests involve increasingly many single-break F-statistics, con- 
ventional distribution theory cannot be used to obtain their limiting distribu- 
tion. However, their limiting distribution is readily  obtained by applying the 
functional central limit theorem and the continuous mapping theory. To obtain 
these limits, suppose that t{jT +  A as T +  00. Let =>  denote weak conver- 
gence on the space D[O,l]. Then (e.g., Andrews and Ploberger  1991), under 
the null hypothesis, 
(B6)  QLR =>  SUp,cr~.  I -  A,F*(S) 
I-A 
mean-Chow  = >  F*(s)ds  I 
037) 
A 
I  -A 
AP exp-W =>  In{  exp(F*(s)/2)ds},  I 
(B8) 
A 
where F*(s) = B,(s)'B,(s)/(s(  1 -  s)),  where Bk(s)  is a k-dimensional Brownian 
bridge; that is, B,(s) = W,(s) -  W,( l), where W,(s)  is a standard k-dimensional 
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case that some regressors are I( l), see Banerjee, Lumsdaine, and Stock (1992) 
and Hansen (1992). The limiting representations in (B6), (B7), and (B8) facili- 
tate the computation of the limiting distributions under the null and thus of the 
critical values for the tests. 
CUSUM-Type Tests 
An  intuitively appealing test for structural breaks is the CUSUM statistic 
proposed by Brown, Durbin, and Evans (1975). This test rejects if the time- 
series models systematically over- or under-forecast y,, more precisely, if the 
cumulated one-step-ahead forecast errors, computed recursively, tend to be ei- 
ther too positive or negative. Ploberger and Kramer (1992a, 1992b) proposed 
a modification of this statistic which is computationally simpler because it is 
based on full-sample residuals rather than recursive residuals. Let e, be the 
residuals from the OLS fit of (B 1), and let SJk) denott; the standardized partial 
sum process of these residuals, that is, SJk) = (C?-2T)-iCt  ~  ,e,,  where e2  is the 
usual OLS estimator of 19.  The two statistics considered here are 
039)  P-K max = max,,,,, #Jk)l 
T 
P-K meansq = T-I~  (sJ~))z. 
The P-K meansq statistic was previously proposed by MacNeill (1978) as a 
test for parameter stability. 
The limiting  distribution  of  these  statistics is readily  obtained  using the 
functional central limit theorem and the continuous mapping theorem. Because 
the regressors are I(0) by assumption, under the null hypothesis the residual 
partial  sum  process  has  the  limit  S,(-/T) => B,(-),  where  B, is  a  one- 
dimensional Brownian bridge on the unit interval. By the continuous mapping 
theorem, we have 
(B11)  P-K max =>  ,,Bl(s) 
k;  I 
P-K meansq =  >  (B,(s))%,  I’ 
which can be used to obtain limiting distributions under the null. 
These tests have nontrivial local asymptotic power only against shifts in the 
intercept term, assuming the regressors are mean zero and stationary: a shift in 
the coefficient  p in a T-  neighborhood  will remain  asymptotically  unde- 
tected, since the sample mean of x, is consistent for zero (formal results pro- 
ceed following Ploberger and Kramer 1990). 
Nyblom’s (1989) Test for Time-Varying Parameters 
A different alternative hypothesis is that the parameters of the process are 
stochastic and follow a random walk. Nyblom  (1989) considered the more 60  Martin Feldstein and James H. Stock 
general alternative that the parameters follow a martingale, a special case of 
which is the single-break model (B2), and LM tests against the random-walk 
alternative. He considered the case that all the parameters are time varying, but 
in our application  we are interested  as well in testing the hypothesis  that  a 
subset of the parameters are time varying. Let R be a q X  k matrix of known 
constants,  so that the null hypothesis  is that R[a,  p,’]’ = R[a p‘]’, and the 
alternative is that 
0313)  HI:  R[a  p,’]’ = 6,  6, = <,_,  + v,,  u, i.i.d. (0,  cr?), 
where  (v,,  . . . , vT)  and (E,, . . . ,  E,)  are independent.  It is maintained  that 
Rt[a,  p,’]’ -  Rt[m p’]‘ = 0,,(T-1’2),  where R’  is the complement of R in %l. In 
the  linear  regression  model  (Bl) for the  alternative  hypothesis  (B 13) with 
jointly normal i.i.d. errors, Nyblom’s (1989) test is 
T 
(B 14)  L = T-1  C  v,(e)yR c  ~~)-lv,(e), 
e=  I 
where 
sum process V,(O = 
In the special case that R tests only the constancy of  the intercept, because 
the regressors have mean zero this test is asymptotically equivalent to the P-K 
meansq statistic. In general, however, these tests differ. Under the null hypothe- 
sis, E,X, is a martingale difference sequence. Thus the asymptotic null represen- 
tation of the statistic is 
is the OLS variance-covariance matrix of (a,  p) and V,  is the partial  e  c e,y[  1 x,’]’. 
,=I 
L =>  B,(s)’B,(s)ds.  1’ 
For  Monte  Car10  results  comparing these  tests  in  the  linear  regression 
model, see Andrews, Lee, and Ploberger (1992). 
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Comment  John B. Taylor 
My  comments focus mainly on the policy aspects of this paper by  Martin 
Feldstein and James Stock. The authors provide us with a thorough analysis of 
nominal GDP targeting culminating in a specific policy rule for the Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC) to follow when conducting monetary pol- 
icy. Actually there are two alternative policy rules discussed in the paper. One 
rule is extraordinarily complicated. It would have the FOMC respond to several 
lagged values of every variable the authors bring into the analysis. This rule is 
computed using linear quadratic control methods based on an estimated vector 
autoregression. 
The second policy rule is a very simple feedback rule in which the growth 
rate of M2 is adjusted in response to the deviations of nominal GDP growth 
from  a  stated target.  When  nominal GDP  growth  exceeds the target, the 
growth of M2 is slowed by the FOMC. When nominal GDP growth falls be- 
low target, the growth of M2 speeds up. The authors favor the second simple 
rule over the more complicated rule. For example, they do not even write 
down the more complicated rule in the paper. Hence, most of my comments 
are directed to this simple rule. 
I find several features of the FeldsteidStock policy analysis and their pro- 
posals for monetary policy to be very attractive. First, monetary policy actions 
are discussed entirely within  a modem policy rule framework. The paper 
shows how sophisticated econometric analysis can be brought into the policy 
evaluation process and at the same time incorporate the advantages of policy 
rules, including credibility and greater certainty about policy. 
Second, the policy rule they propose is an example of a responsive rule that 
contrasts with constant growth rate rules for the money supply, as proposed by 
Milton Friedman. The authors provide considerable evidence that this respon- 
siveness would improve economic performance. This more general notion of 
a policy rule is a common feature of modem macro research. 
Third, the rule implicitly entails a flexible exchange-rate system. Monetary 
policy-as  described by their policy rule-is  not guided directly by exchange 
rates or events abroad. That this is likely to be preferred to a policy rule that 
incorporates exchange rates is a finding which appears to be emerging from 
several research efforts, including my own. 
Fourth, in analyzing the performance properties of  their proposed rule- 
that is, how the policy rule would affect macroeconomic performance-the 
authors do not stop with a point estimate of the reduction in volatility of this 
target variable (nominal GDP). They also report statistical confidence meas- 
ures. For example, they estimate that there is an 85 percent chance that the 
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simple rule would improve performance by reducing the variance of nominal 
GDP. This is a welcome innovation in policy evaluation research. 
Fifth, the authors’ method of looking for a simple rule that approximates a 
more complicated rule derived from optimal control is a good one. It is cer- 
tainly essential that a rule be fairly simple if it is to be used in practice. While 
the authors’  simulations indicate that their simple rule would work well in 
reducing the volatility of nominal GDP, it would be useful to formalize the 
approximation method. It might be possible to improve on the approximation 
and show how analogous approximation methods could be used in other appli- 
cations. For example, in  Taylor (1981)  I  used results  from David Livesey 
(1980) to approximate the more complex rules I had computed in an earlier 
paper (Taylor 1979). 
Despite these valuable features of the FeldsteidStock paper, I have several 
concerns  about  the  results,  especially  when  viewed  as something  for the 
FOMC to use in practice. I have some suggestions for future research based 
on these concerns. 
One concern is methodological. In evaluating the effects of policy, Feldstein 
and Stock do not use a structural model. For example, they neither take a posi- 
tion on a credit or money view of monetary policy, nor do they say whether a 
sticky-price or sticky-transactions view underlies the monetary transmission 
mechanism; further, they state no assumptions about international capital mo- 
bility, which in many countries figures as a key issue in exchange-rate policy. 
Perhaps it is asking too much to provide a policy model in areas where there 
is still so much controversy, but in my view, depending entirely on reduced- 
form correlations is worse than using some structural model, or certainly worse 
than using several alternative structural models. Instead, the authors use an 
estimated vector autoregression (VAR). They simply replace the equation for 
M2 in the VAR  and see how the stochastic-dynamic properties of the VAR 
change through stochastic simulation. 
An alternative approach is to develop a structural econometric framework. 
Technically speaking, my concern is with the Lucas critique-that  the parame- 
ters of  the VAR  will change with policy. I do not mean this criticism to be 
destructive, for I think using structural models is an alternative approach that 
deals with the Lucas critique. The framework I use includes staggered con- 
tracts, perfect capital mobility, and an interest-rate view of the monetary trans- 
mission mechanism. Even if  you  do not like this particular model, there are 
many structural models with which to do the analysis. For example, Ralph 
Bryant, Peter  Hooper, and Catherine Mann  (1993) have used  a number of 
econometric models to comparatively evaluate the performance of policy rules 
like the one suggested by the authors. 
Are these technical concerns quantitatively important to the analysis? Con- 
sider two examples. First, the authors’ simulations seem to show that with their 
optimal policy rule, inflation would have gone into double digits in the 1970s, 65  The Use of Monetary Aggregate to Target Nominal GDP 
and the 1982 recession would have been worse than it was. See figure 1.4 of 
their paper. But would not a money rule such as that which the authors suggest 
have been able to avoid the great inflation and the subsequent great disinflation 
of the early 1980s? Perhaps the use of a reduced-form correlation explains this 
finding. Second, using the reduced forms may explain why the performance 
improvement is so small; the volatility of inflation is reduced by only 6.6 per- 
cent during the past twenty years. 
I am also concerned with the authors’ stated goal of policy. I found that the 
paper focused too much on nomind GDP growth rather than its two compo- 
nents. Should not the criterion of performance relate more directly to how the 
economy performs in the two dimensions we  care about: inflation and real 
GDP? What are the implications of the policy rule for the fluctuations in infla- 
tion and real GDP? I am also concerned about not using the Zevel  of nominal 
GDP in the evaluation. Feldstein and Stock discuss this, but it seems to me that 
a good policy allows a speedup in growth (above potential GDP growth) after 
a recession. In my view, the faster growth in the United States compared with 
that in Europe just after the 1982 recession is an example of a better policy. 
My  preference is to examine policy in terms of (1) the deviations of real 
GDP from an estimate of potential GDP and (2) the fluctuations in inflation. 
Robert Hall and Greg Mankiw in their paper in this volume (chap. 2) call such 
a rule a hybrid nominal-income rule. I proposed such a rule in my  1985 paper 
(Taylor 1985) and called it a modijied nominal-income rule. It might even be 
better to consider a rule that looks at the deviation of  the price level from a 
target as well. But the point is that if  we are concerned about inflation and 
economic fluctuations, then  it  would  be  useful  to  examine these features 
directly. 
Another concern is the complete focus on M2 as the policy instrument. One 
of  the appealing features of  nominal GDP targeting is that it automatically 
controls for velocity shifts. If you use M2 as an instrument, you bring velocity 
shocks right back in. One could have considered a rule with the federal funds 
rate as the instrument. In fact, one rule I have found attractive has the federal 
funds rate adjusted up if  GDP goes above target or if  inflation goes above 
target, and vice versa. This rule comes fairly close to the type of decision the 
Fed actually makes, so it may be a more plausible place to begin. It also ap- 
pears as a preferred instrument in the Bryant, Hooper, and Mann (1993) review 
of policy evaluation using structural models. 
The paper addresses the design of a policy rule, not its operation. However, 
it raises some operational questions. How would such a rule operate in the 
context of the FOMC as currently constructed? Should the Fed publicly state 
the rule and give an explanation to Congress whenever policy does not con- 
form to the policy rule? To get things started, one possibility, at least in the 
short term, would be for the FOMC to have the Fed staff put in their briefing 
books the M2 growth forecasts implied by  the rule. Then the FOMC could at 66  Martin Feldstein and James H. Stock 
least discuss policy in the context of the rule. However, with our current state 
of knowledge, some alternative rules-including  an interest rate rule-would 
probably need to be placed alongside the FeldsteidStock rule. 
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Comment  Bennett T. McCallum 
The Feldstein and Stock paper is a stimulating and constructive addition to the 
growing literature on nominal income targeting. It includes some nice techni- 
cal innovations, such as the derivation of the distribution of ?,,  the estimator 
of a variance-reduction performance measure. And from a substantive policy 
perspective, the spirit of Feldstein and Stock’s paper is in many ways similar 
to that of my own work,’ so there is much in it that I would applaud. But there 
are also some important differences which deserve to be pointed out. 
In discussing these differences I will focus on Feldstein and Stock’s simpli- 
fied policy rule (13) rather than their “optimal” rule of  form (9). Because of 
its comparative simplicity, the former is considerably more attractive from a 
practical policy perspective, given that it performs nearly as well as the “opti- 
mal” rule in the one particular model in which the latter is (by construction) 
optimal.  Since there is no professional  agreement on  the “true” model, the 
Bennett T. McCallum is the H. J. Heinz Professor of Economics at Carnegie Mellon University 
and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
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real variables; (ii) output and growth levels will be essentially independent, over !diig  spans of 
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sensible way to proceed-as  I have argued-is  to look for a simple rule that 
will perform reasonably well in a variety of models. 
This simplified rule (1  3) is fairly similar to the one emphasized in my work,* 
but differs in three significant ways. One, which Feldstein and Stock mention, 
is that their targets are set in terms of GDP growth rates rather than levels along 
a prespecified growth path. Thus their rule (1  3) treats past target misses as 
bygones, matters not requiring corrective action. With regard to this difference, 
I am quite sympathetic to their position. In fact, my most recent working paper 
on the subject (McCallum 1990b) provides some support for that position, that 
is, for targets of  the form x,** = x,-,  + 0.00739 rather than  x,* = x,*-,  + 
0.00739.3  Of course a weighted average of x,** and x,* would be another possibil- 
ity worth considering. 
A second difference, not explicitly mentioned, is that my rule is specified in 
terms of settings for the monetary base rather than Mzs4  One of my tenets for 
the analysis of policy rules has been that a rule should be specified in opera- 
tional form, relying on available data and with an instrument that the Fed can 
actually control. Feldstein and Stock recognize that M2 is not such a variable, 
and that as matters stand their rule would not be operational. Their response is 
to propose some rather major regulatory changes that would make M2 more 
controllable-basically,  uniform reserve requirements on all components of 
M2 (with the payment of interest on reserves). But even with such changes, 
M2 would still not be a fully controllable instrument-it  would not be a quan- 
tity that appears on the Fed's own balance sheet or an instantly observable 
interest rate. So a complete statement of their rule would still require specifi- 
cation of  the link between M2 and a genuine instrument. And regarding the 
suitability of the base as an instrument, I would argue that their results in sec- 
tion 1.6 are not compelling. What they show is that there has not been a stable 
relationship between the base and nominal GDP over the period 1960-92. But 
my rule was designed to be applicable despite changing relationships (see prin- 
ciple [iv] in note 1) and therefore embodies two semiactivist adjustment mech- 
anisms, one intended for cyclical fluctuations and one for longer-lasting insti- 
tutional changes. 
The third difference in rule specification is less obvious. It is that their rule 
2. That rule specifies quarterly adjustments in growth of the monetary base according to the 
formula Ab, = 0.00739 -  (1/16)(x,-, -  b,-, -  x,-,, + b,-,,) + A(x,'_, -  x,-J  where 6, andx, are 
logs of the monetary base and nominal GNP averaged over quarter t. The target variable x,* grows 
at a constant pace, x,*  = x,*-,  + 0.00739, chosen to reflect an assumed 3 percent annual growth 
rate of output and zero inflation. These values could of course be specified differently without 
affecting the form of the rule. Various values of the adjustment coefficient A have been considered, 
with good performance obtained for the range of values 0.1-0.25. 
3. For notation, see note 2. 
4. McCallum  (1990a) also considers  the use of  a short-term interest-rate instrument. In his 
recent work  on nominal income targeting, John Taylor (1988, 1993) has  used an interest-rate 
instrument. This is, of course, the instrument actually used at present by almost all central banks. 
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(1  3) relies upon an assumption about the average growth rate of velocity that 
will prevail in the future. Whereas my rule constantly updates its implicit fore- 
casts of  this magnitude on the basis of  past velocity changes, theirs incorpo- 
rates the assumption that M2 velocity growth will be fixed at the value zero. It 
is of course true that M2  velocity has shown neither upward nor downward 
trends since 1960, but I believe it would be a mistake to rely upon this pattern 
to continue in the future. After all, M2 velocity behavior was drastically differ- 
ent before  1960, as chart 57 of  Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 640) quite 
clearly shows. 
Therefore, from a methodological perspective, I would fault the Feldstein 
and Stock study for building this constant-velocity assumption into their rule 
when  studying its performance over the period  1960-92. Had they proposed 
their rule (13) in 1960, they would have had no basis for setting pm  equal to 
p,,  so the specification studied in table 1.10  is one that relies on ex post knowl- 
edge gained from the experience of the 1960-92  period. The rule used in my 
studies, by contrast, relies on no such ex post knowledge but instead incorpo- 
rates the velocity-adjustment term mentioned above. 
I would also suggest, in conclusion, that their presumption about velocity 
growth is one manifestation of a somewhat excessive emphasis on a rule’s abil- 
ity to smooth fluctuations, with inadequate concern given to its “trend” proper- 
ties-to  its ability to generate the desired amount of inflation on average (be 
it 0 or 2 percent per annum, or whatever). Feldstein and Stock conduct their 
study as if it were trivial to design a rule that would accomplish this objective. 
But it is not, I would suggest, in analytical studies that are realistic about opera- 
tionality and about our lack of knowledge of the economy’s structure.5 
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